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ARTICLE
Ido Baum
The Accidental Lawyer: A Law and Economics Perspective
on Inadvertent Waiver
Abstract. The inadvertent waiver doctrine is part of the attorney–client
privilege but its application lacks uniformity and thus is a major cause for
distress for lawyers and clients. The concerns about an inadvertent waiver
of the privilege intensify as technology changes the way attorneys and
clients interact. Accordingly, seeking legal advice has become a dangerous
activity.
This Article first demonstrates that courts treat inadvertent waiver as a
type of accident without duly attending to the implications of the concept.
Drawing on economic analysis of tort law, this Article identifies how the
liability regimes and unique harm rules applied by courts to determine
whether inadvertent waiver has occurred undermine the objective of the
privilege to encourage full and frank exchange of information between
attorneys and clients.
The second part of this Article asserts that imputing inadvertent
disclosure of privileged evidence by attorneys to their clients contradicts
the prevalent rationale of the attorney–client privilege. Imputing
inadvertent waiver by attorneys to their clients creates a moral hazard
problem. This problem is not sufficiently mitigated by incentives such as
the attorney’s ethical duties, concerns about malpractice liability, or
professional reputation. This Article suggests that the practice should be
eliminated or at least minimized.
Author. Associate Professor, Haim Striks School of Law, College of
Management—Academic Studies, Rishon LeZion, Israel.*
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I. INTRODUCTION
This Article deals with those “oops!” moments in life, particularly in the
context of the professional relationship between attorneys and their clients.
For example, an unfortunate accident happened to an employee of a
Baltimore law firm who routinely removed a hard drive containing client
information from her employer’s office and carried it home as a precaution
against flood or fire.1 On an August evening, the employee forgot the
hard drive on the train while on her way home and was unable to locate it
when she returned to the train.2 The hard drive contained private medical
records of the firms’ clients involved in medical malpractice lawsuits and
additional privileged attorney–client information.3 The information was
password protected, but not encrypted.4 This was a nightmarish
experience for the firm and its clients. Aside from data-privacy protection
issues, a myriad of questions concerning the attorney–client privilege
spring to mind. Can one claim the firm was negligent in protecting the
privilege when it was actually taking precautions to protect the integrity of
the electronic information stored on the hard drive? If it is claimed the
firm was negligent, does this inadvertent loss result in the waiver of the
attorney–client privilege? If so, does it make sense for the firm’s clients to
lose their attorney–client privilege as a result of an incident over which
they had no control?5
The attorney–client privilege has been part of the common law since
days of yore. It shields the client from compelled disclosure of confidential
communications between the client and his lawyer for the purpose of
obtaining or rendering legal advice.6 The aim of the privilege is to foster
* The author is grateful to Samuel Becher, Shachar Eldar, Peter Tague, and the participants at
the St. Mary’s Symposium on Legal Malpractice and Ethics, the Canadian Law and Economics
Conference 2012, and Tilburg University Law and Economics Center (Tilec) workshop for their
helpful comments. Research assistance by Omer Chodorov and Yaniv Schwartz contributed to the
final version. The author wishes to express his gratitude for grants from the research fund of the
Haim Striks School of Law and from the Rina and Meir Heth Foundation.
1. Tricia Bishop, Law Firm Loses Hard Drive with Patient Records, BALT. SUN (Oct. 10, 2011,
8:31 PM), www.baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/bs-md-stent-hard-drive-20111010,0,599052.
story.
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. I will also refer to the attorney–client privilege as the “privilege” or the “lawyer–client
privilege.” When referring to the “inadvertent waiver” doctrine, I refer to accidental or unintentional
disclosure of privileged attorney–client communications as opposed to voluntary disclosure of
privileged communications.
6. See United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357, 357–58 (D. Mass. 1950)
(“The rule which allows a client to prevent the disclosure of information which he gave to his
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free and frank exchange of information and advice,7 which is perceived to
be a good thing. The downside is that by shielding confidential
communications from exposure to opposing litigants, the privilege also
withholds this information from the court.8 Consequently, exercising the
privilege may lead to inaccurate judgments.
Inadvertent waiver is part and parcel of the privilege. The gist of
inadvertent waiver is that when confidentiality with regard to privileged
communications is lost, the privilege can be stripped away by the court.9
Presumably, inadvertent waiver indicates the client did not take sufficient
precautions to protect the confidentiality of information communicated to
the lawyer in the process of seeking and receiving legal advice. It could
happen at any time and place. Lack of care leading to the loss of the
privilege may occur in the course of the communication with the lawyer or
at some other time.10 Sometimes clients invest in taking precautions, but
still disclose privileged communications by accident; investment in
precautions only reduces the probability of an accident but does not
completely eliminate it.11
attorney for the purpose of securing legal assistance is founded upon the belief that it is necessary ‘in
the interest and administration of justice.’” (quoting Hunt v. Blackburn, 128 U.S. 464, 470 (1888)));
8 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2292, at 554 (1961)
(“[T]he privilege remains an exception to the general duty to disclose.”).
7. See Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 403 (1976) (“The purpose of the privilege is to
encourage clients to make full disclosure to their attorneys.”).
8. See id. (“However, since the privilege has the effect of withholding relevant information from
the fact-finder, it applies only where necessary to achieve its purpose.”); In re Grand Jury Proceedings,
219 F.3d 175, 182 (2d Cir. 2000) (“[T]he [attorney–client] privilege stands in derogation of the
public’s right to every man’s evidence, . . . it ought to be strictly confined within the narrowest
possible limits consistent with the logic of its principle.” (quoting United States v. Int’l Bhd. Of
Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen & Helpers of Am., AFL-CIO, 119 F.3d 210, 214 (2d Cir.
2010); In re Horowitz, 482 F.2d 72, 81 (2d Cir. 1973)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
9. See Hydraflow, Inc. v. Enidine Inc., 145 F.R.D. 626, 637 (W.D.N.Y. 1993) (“Recent
decisions addressing the issue all impliedly conclude that, in the context of pre-trial discovery, an
attorney’s inadvertent disclosure of an otherwise privileged document may waive the privilege on
behalf of the client.”); Shawn T. Gaither, The Attorney–Client Privilege: An Analysis of Involuntary
Waiver, 48 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 311, 311 (2000) (stating inadvertent waiver may result in waiver of the
attorney–client privilege).
10. For example, there might be a lack of care if a client discusses confidential matters with his
lawyer in a public place where the content of their communications may be overheard by third
parties. The client’s inadvertent waiver can also result from sharing confidential documents covered
by the attorney–client privilege with a third party outside the scope of the privilege circle. See Joyner
v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., 736 A.2d 35, 36 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1999) (discussing waiver of the privilege
by a client who mistakenly left a voice message on opposing counsel’s voicemail).
11. In fact, sometimes a precaution against one type of accident may increase the probability of
another type of accident, as evidenced by the Baltimore law firm that lost a hard drive that contained
client data. Tricia Bishop, Law Firm Loses Hard Drive with Patient Records, BALT. SUN (Oct. 10,
2011, 8:31 PM), http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/bs-md-stent-hard-drive-201110
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When the opposing counsel detects an inadvertent waiver in litigation, a
battle will often ensue. Opposing counsel normally endeavors to submit
into evidence the previously confidential information if such evidence is in
the party’s possession.12 If it is not in the opposing counsel’s possession, a
discovery motion to reveal the inadvertently disclosed evidence is the next
move.13 The client and his lawyer will usually have to prove they did not
waive the privilege by the inadvertent disclosure and then try to dissuade
the court from using or ordering the disclosure of previously confidential
communications.14
The judge must then determine whether the inadvertent disclosure of
the confidential communications constituted a waiver of the privilege.15
An affirmative answer would mean the disclosed communications are no
longer privileged. Otherwise, the court may forbid opposing counsel from
introducing such evidence at trial.
The doctrine of inadvertent waiver is far from settled and is the cause of
growing concern among practitioners and clients for many reasons.16
First, the application of the waiver doctrine in case law is characterized
by a significant lack of uniformity.17 Courts treat inadvertent waiver as a
form of accident, but do so without a proper analysis of the concept.
10,0,599052.story.
12. See Int’l Digital Sys. Corp. v. Digital Equip. Corp., 120 F.R.D. 445, 445–46 (D. Mass.
1988) (ruling on a protective order where confidential information was inadvertently turned over to
opposing counsel).
13. See Wallace v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 179 F.R.D. 313, 314 (D. Kan. 1998) (overruling a
motion to produce inadvertently disclosed documents); Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Singh, 140 F.R.D.
252, 252 (D. Me. 1992) (ruling on a motion to compel the production of a document that was
inadvertently disclosed).
14. See Amgen, Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., 190 F.R.D. 287, 292 (D. Mass. 2000)
(“[The defendant] moves this Court to compel return of the inadvertently produced documents.”);
Int’l Digital Sys. Corp., 120 F.R.D. at 446 (“The plaintiff . . . seeks a protective order compelling the
defendant . . . to return copies of twenty documents which are protected by the attorney–client
privilege but which [the plaintiff] turned over to [the defendant] allegedly inadvertently, as part of the
document production in this case. The issue is whether the disclosure by [the plaintiff] is to be held
to be a waiver of the privilege as to the documents disclosed.”).
15. See Alpert v. Riley, 267 F.R.D. 202, 209 (S.D. Tex. 2010) (considering five factors to
determine if an inadvertent disclosure of certain documents results in a waiver of the attorney–client
privilege for an inadvertent disclosure).
16. See Julie Cohen, Note, Look Before You Leap: A Guide to the Law of Inadvertent Disclosure of
Privileged Information in the Era of E-Discovery, 93 IOWA L. REV. 627, 631 (2008) (concluding the
law of inadvertent waiver is far from clear, although the promulgation of the new Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure 26(b), 26(f), 18(f), and the proposed Federal Rule of Evidence 502, may provide
some ease for parties facing this issue).
17. See JOHN WILLIAM GERGACZ, ATTORNEY–CORPORATE CLIENT PRIVILEGE 5-35 (1990)
(“[T]he inadvertent disclosure issue is now as confused as any other issue raised under the privilege
waiver doctrine.”).
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However, no analysis exists with respect to the implications of
conceptualizing inadvertent waiver as an accident, despite the fact that its
application imposes a work-intensive judicial burden on already
overburdened courts. By developing a stylized conception of inadvertent
waiver, this Article will therefore propose an optimal synchronization of
the inadvertent waiver doctrine with the privilege.
The courts have adopted at least three regimes for determining whether
an inadvertent disclosure of attorney–client communications should be
considered a waiver. This Article will demonstrate these regimes
correspond to the three familiar regimes of tort law liability: strict liability,
negligence, and no-liability.18 The uncertainty stemming from the lack of
a single clear regime does not end there. Courts that adopt a negligence
regime—the one most commonly used—employ different standards of
care in order to assess whether a lawyer was indeed negligent in disclosing
confidential attorney–client communications.19 The most common
standard is known as “the five-factor test.”20
18. Paula Schaefer, The Future of Inadvertent Disclosure: The Lingering Need to Revise
Professional Conduct Rules, 69 MD. L. REV. 195, 213–14 (2010) (noting “[h]istorically, federal and
state courts have followed one of three tests to determine if an unintentional disclosure of privileged
information results in waiver,” and referring to these approaches as the “strict,” “lenient,” and, the
most commonly followed, “balancing” approaches).
19. Compare Alpert, 267 F.R.D. at 209 (“The factors to consider include: ‘(1) the
reasonableness of precautions taken to prevent disclosure; (2) the amount of time taken to remedy the
error; (3) the scope of discovery; (4) the extent of the disclosure; and (5) the overriding issue of
fairness.’” (quoting Alldread v. City of Grenada, 988 F.2d 1425, 1433–34 (5th Cir. 1993))), and
Amgen, Inc., 190 F.R.D. at 291 (“This approach empowers courts to consider a number of
circumstances relating to the inadvertent production, including (1) the reasonableness of the
precautions taken to prevent inadvertent disclosure, (2) the amount of time it took the producing
party to recognize its error, (3) the scope of the production, (4) the extent of the inadvertent
disclosure, and (5) the overriding interest of fairness and justice.”), with Hydraflow, Inc. v. Enidine
Inc., 145 F.R.D. 626, 637 (W.D.N.Y. 1993) (considering “(1) the reasonableness of the precautions
taken to prevent inadvertent disclosure in view of the extent of the document production, (2) the
number of inadvertent disclosures, (3) the extent of the disclosure, (4) the promptness of measures
taken to rectify the disclosure, and (5) whether the overriding interests of justice would or would not
be served by relieving the party of its error”), and Pinnacle Pizza Co. v. Little Caesar Enters., Inc.,
627 F. Supp. 2d 1069, 1074 (D.S.D. 2007) (considering “(1) the reasonableness of the precautions
taken to prevent inadvertent disclosure in light of the extent of document production; (2) the
number of inadvertent disclosures; (3) the extent of the disclosures; (4) the promptness of measures
taken to remedy the problem; and (5) whether justice is served by relieving the party of its error”).
20. According to the five-factor test, determining whether disclosure of privileged
communication waives the attorney–client privilege or work product protection requires the court to
consider: “(1) the reasonableness of precautions taken to prevent disclosure; (2) the amount of time
taken to remedy the error; (3) the scope of discovery; (4) the extent of the disclosure; and (5) the
overriding issue of fairness.” Alldread, 988 F.2d at 1433. The five-factor test can be traced to Lois
Sportswear U.S.A., Inc. v. Levi Strauss & Co., 104 F.R.D. 103 (S.D.N.Y. 1985). The five-factor test is
applied in a variety of cases. See, e.g., Alpert, 267 F.R.D. at 213 (applying the five-factor test in
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Second, little attention is given to the compatibility of the inadvertent
waiver doctrine with the current dominant rationale of the attorney–client
privilege, which aims to promote compliance with the law by encouraging
clients to seek legal advice about contemplated acts under the cloak of the
privilege.21 This Article will demonstrate that some of the applications of
the inadvertent waiver doctrine are inconsistent with the privilege’s current
rationale.
The following discussion utilizes familiar concepts from the economic
analysis of law to complete the missing parts of the inadvertent waiver
jigsaw puzzle.
The economic analysis perspective offers a fuller
understanding of the existing inadvertent liability regimes. For this
purpose, the Article also identifies the missing component in the
conceptualization of inadvertent waiver as an accident: the concept of
harm.
By harm, I mean that the client’s case in litigation is weakened,
regardless of whether the client is the plaintiff or the defendant. Courts
often use tort law terminology in their treatment of inadvertent waiver
cases.22 However, this Article will claim courts have not addressed the fact
determining that waiver occurred when files were placed on an adverse party’s computer); Ergo
Licensing, LLC v. Carefusion 303, Inc., 263 F.R.D. 40, 46 (D. Me. 2009) (using the five-factor test
to find that no waiver occurred when documents were inadvertently produced in response to a
request by the opposing party); Pinnacle Pizza Co., 627 F. Supp. 2d at 1075 (reviewing the five
factors and deciding that confidential information divulged during a deposition was not a waiver of
the privilege); United Investors Life Ins. Co. v. Nationwide Life Ins. Co., 233 F.R.D. 483, 490
(N.D. Miss. 2006) (outlining the five-factor test in a case involving disclosure of privileged
materials); Amgen, Inc., 190 F.R.D. at 292 (relying upon the five-factor test in determining whether
an attorney’s private files were inadvertently disclosed); Wallace v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 179 F.R.D.
313, 314 (D. Kan. 1998) (noting the district court applies the five-factor test to determine whether
waiver of the attorney–client privilege occurred). However, some courts adopted other criteria. See
Coburn Group, LLC v. Whitecap Advisors LLC, 640 F. Supp. 2d 1032, 1037–41 (N.D. Ill. 2009)
(examining whether the party intended to produce a privileged or protected document or whether the
production was a mistake).
21. Infra Section A.1 (“Justifying the Privilege: The Compliance Rationale”). One notable
exception is the economic analysis of inadvertent waiver during pretrial discovery. Alan J. Meese,
Inadvertent Waiver of the Attorney-Client Privilege by Disclosure of Documents: An Economic Analysis,
23 CREIGHTON L. REV. 513, 513–14 (1990). Meese identifies and discusses the similarities between
inadvertent waiver case law and economic analysis of tort law with a focus on property rights. See id.
at 516 (“[T]he privilege is a sort of property right which encourages the generation of information
which in turn serves the goals of the justice system.”). Additionally, Meese does not differentiate
between the application of inadvertent waiver to clients and its application to lawyers, the
development of different harm rules on top of the variety of liability rules, or the different effects on
repeat as opposed to one-shot players. These issues are discussed below.
22. See Ciba–Geigy Corp. v. Sandoz Ltd., 916 F. Supp. 404, 410 (D.N.J. 1996) (describing
inadvertent disclosure as an unintentional act and further stating that a disclosure resulting from gross
negligence could be considered intentional and result in waiver of the privilege).
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that inadvertent waiver is a unique form of accident. It is unique because
of the nature of the harm suffered by the client in the context of
inadvertent waiver. Unlike other accidents, the harm resulting from
inadvertent waiver is not given exogenously for the court to assess. Rather,
the court defines and inflicts the harm in the inadvertent waiver context.23
Therefore, it is essential to understand properly the manner in which
courts determine the scope of the harm they inflict. This Article will
demonstrate that courts formulate a number of rules for determining
harm. Naturally, the application of the various rules in combination with
other traits of the inadvertent waiver doctrine has implications for the
behavior of clients and lawyers. The Article will proceed to utilize the
accident framework in order to predict the implications of the inadvertent
waiver doctrine on different types of clients and on their overall incentive
to seek legal advice.
Once a complete framework of the inadvertent waiver doctrine is
established, including the harm component, its insights will support a reexamination of the disputed practice of applying the doctrine to lawyers’
inadvertent disclosure of client communications. There is a wealth of
academic literature concerning inadvertent waiver, some of which also
discusses inadvertent waiver by lawyers.24 However, scant attention has

23. See Gray v. Bicknell, 86 F.3d 1472, 1484 (8th Cir. 1996) (noting the balanced approach
gives the trial court “broad discretion as to whether waiver occurred and, if so, the scope of that
waiver”).
24. See generally Kenneth S. Broun & Daniel J. Capra, Getting Control of Waiver of Privilege in
the Federal Courts: A Proposal for a Federal Rule of Evidence 502, 58 S.C. L. REV. 211, 219–24 (2006)
(addressing the problem of disclosing documents protected by the attorney–client privilege); John M.
Facciola, Sailing on Confused Seas: Privilege Waiver and the New Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 2
FED. CTS. L. REV. 57, 61–64 (2007) (discussing the implications of a new rule of Federal Civil
Procedure regarding inadvertent disclosures); Roberta Harding, Waiver: A Comprehensive Analysis of a
Consequence of Inadvertently Producing Documents Protected by the Attorney–Client Privilege, 42 CATH.
U. L. REV. 465, 471–74 (1993) (examining the tests courts apply when there is an inadvertent
disclosure of a document); Richard L. Marcus, The Perils of Privilege: Waiver and the Litigator, 84
MICH. L. REV. 1605, 1608–54 (1986) (articulating a framework for courts to determine waiver
decisions); Joseph W. Rand, What Would Learned Hand Do?: Adapting to Technological Change and
Protecting the Attorney-Client Privilege on the Internet, 66 BROOK. L. REV. 361, 366–75 (2000)
(describing the challenges regarding the lawyer–client privilege that lawyers are confronted with due
to the increase of new technology); Audrey Rogers, New Insights on Waiver and the Inadvertent
Disclosure of Privileged Materials: Attorney Responsibility As the Governing Precept, 47 FLA. L. REV.
159, 178–86 (1995) (discussing a number of different issues an inadvertent disclosure raises); Julie
Cohen, Note, Look Before You Leap: A Guide to the Law of Inadvertent Disclosure of Privileged
Information in the Era of E-Discovery, 93 IOWA L. REV. 627, 631 (2008) (“This Note concludes that
the amendments and the proposed rule may provide some relief to parties dealing with issues of
inadvertent waiver, but it cautions parties to continue to conduct careful privilege reviews. As the law
currently stands, the consequences of waiver are far from clear.”).
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been given to the justifications of attributing inadvertent waiver by the
attorney to the client in light of the dominant compliance rationale of the
privilege. Attribution of the lawyer’s inadvertent waiver to the client is
often justified by the theory that the lawyer is the client’s agent.25 This
justification is dubious because, as I will demonstrate, the symbiosis
between the lawyer and his client in the framework of their agency
relationship is far from perfect. Thus, learning about the client’s
confidentiality concerns from the lawyer’s behavior could well be
inefficient, if not counterproductive, given the purpose served by the
privilege to date.
The problem of inadvertent waiver by lawyers due to disclosure of
confidential communications is a very salient one.26 The problem is
compounded by the influence of technology and its effect on the way
lawyers perform their professional tasks. In particular, it has changed the
way lawyers communicate with their clients, the way they maintain
lawyer–client confidential information, the methods they use to screen and
analyze raw information provided by their clients, and the way they
transfer information to opposing litigants in pretrial discovery.27 Pretrial
25. See Grace M. Giesel, Client Responsibility for Lawyer Conduct: Examining the Agency Nature
of the Lawyer-Client Relationship, 86 NEB. L. REV. 346, 349 (2007) (“The attorney–client
relationship needs no special rules that apply only to it. . . . The wronged client has the protection of
both the attorney discipline system and a malpractice action. One must also recognize that clients in
today’s legal services market are often sophisticated users of legal services and in control not only of
global decisions relating to the representation, but also of more instrumental or ministerial decisions.
These clients should be held accountable for their agent’s actions. There is no unfairness in doing
so.”). Giesel’s view of sophisticated clients might be true for corporate or repeat players in litigation,
but it is less obvious with respect to one-shot clients. This is a dichotomy often overlooked when
discussing the privilege, addressed infra Section A.4 (“Interim Conclusions: A Focus on Corporate
Clients”).
26. The issue of confidentiality is central to the work and some of the recommendations made
by the ABA Commission on Ethics 20/20. See ABA COMMISSION ON ETHICS 20/20,
INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW 1 (Feb. 2013), available at http://www.americanbar.org/
content/dam/aba/administrative/ethics_2020/20121112_ethics_20_20_overarching_report_final_wi
th_disclaimer.authcheckdam.pdf (addressing “a wide range of topics, including confidentiality in a
digital age”). The Ethics 20/20 Report on outsourcing of legal activities “was particularly interested
in procedures to protect confidential information” and the methods used by outsourcing providers to
safeguard the confidentiality of information. ABA COMMISSION ON ETHICS 20/20, INITIAL DRAFT
PROPOSAL—OUTSOURCING 3 (May 2, 2011), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/d
am/aba/administrative/professional_responsibility/20110502_outsourcing.authcheckdam.pdf. These
methods include encryption, firewalls, biometric identification to prevent unauthorized access to
data, monitoring of employee computers, disabling the use of portable data storage devices, and
periodic audits of these measures. Id. at 4.
27. ABA COMMISSION ON ETHICS 20/20, INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW 1 (Feb. 2013),
available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/ethics_2020/20121112_
ethics_20_20_overarching_report_final_with_disclaimer.authcheckdam.pdf.
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discovery is highly influenced by the growth of electronic information
retention and sharing possibilities as well as the legal obligations to retain
information.28 Technological developments, such as the ability to share
information quickly online and use “cloud computing” data retention to
store and access vast amounts of information, have made confidential
information more accessible to intruders.29 This reality amplifies the
lawyer’s need to protect lawyer–client communications and to screen them
for privileged material before producing documents in discovery
proceedings.30 Inadvertent waiver, as a result of negligent protection or
screening of documents, may entail the disclosure of privileged material to
rival litigants. This, supposedly, is the lawyer’s nightmare. In order to
avoid the unfortunate consequences of inadvertent waiver, expensive prediscovery screening costs are spent in litigation.31 However, the
28. See David Degnan, Accounting for the Costs of Electronic Discovery, 12 MINN. J.L. SCI. &
TECH. 151, 156 (2011) (observing courts broadly interpret the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as
implying expansive preservation of documents); see also Douglas L. Rogers, A Search for Balance in the
Discovery of ESI Since December 1, 2006, 14 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 8, 10 (2008) (“The Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure allow for—and the intent behind them indeed call for—more restraints on discovery
than many courts and parties recognize.”).
29. See Konop v. Hawaiian Airlines, Inc., 302 F.3d 868, 875–76 (9th Cir. 2002) (detailing the
unauthorized access to online materials); Sasha K. Danna, Recent Development, The Impact of
Electronic Discovery on Privilege and the Applicability of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 38
LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1683, 1742 (2005) (noting discovery material secured and stored online may still
be accessible by unauthorized users).
30. ABA COMMISSION ON ETHICS 20/20, INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW 8 (Feb. 2013),
available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/ethics_2020/20121112_
ethics_20_20_overarching_report_final_with_disclaimer.authcheckdam.pdf (concluding with respect
to the lawyer’s duty to protect the confidences of the client “that technological change has so
enhanced the importance of this duty that it should be identified in the black letter of Rule 1.6 and
described in more detail through additional Comment language”); see Hopson v. City of Balt., 232
F.R.D. 228, 244 (D. Md. 2005) (bemoaning that e-discovery may encompass millions of documents
and impose non-proportional costs on the parties due to the need to conduct record by record preproduction review); Emily Burns et al., E-Discovery: One Year of the Amended Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, 64 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 201, 201–02 (2008) (elaborating on the information
explosion in creation and storage of data); Dennis R. Kiker, Waiving the Privilege in a Storm of Data:
An Argument for Uniformity and Rationality in Dealing with the Inadvertent Production of Privileged
Materials in the Age of Electronically Stored Information, 12 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 1, 3–6 (2006)
(relating the information explosion in creation and storage of data with respect to potentially
discoverable business information); Joseph W. Rand, What Would Learned Hand Do?: Adapting to
Technological Change and Protecting the Attorney-Client Privilege on the Internet, 66 BROOK. L. REV.
361, 362 (2001) (observing in the era of digital communications “lawyers have all sorts of new and
exciting ways in which they can inadvertently breach their clients’ confidences”); Paula Schaefer, The
Future of Inadvertent Disclosure: The Lingering Need to Revise Professional Conduct Rules, 69 MD. L.
REV. 195, 199 (2010) (“Clients and their attorneys are creating and maintaining ever-increasing
volumes of electronically stored information and have the means to communicate that information to
third parties with great ease.”).
31. For a general assessment of the costs of pre-production privilege review, see David Degnan,
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combination of rising litigation costs and uncertainty about the application
of the inadvertent waiver doctrine did not go unnoticed by the legislature.
Legislative amendments to the Federal Rules of Evidence (FRE) attempted
to mitigate the uncertainty surrounding the inadvertent liability regimes
and the vague standards of care developed by the courts.32 Yet, this has
not inspired a re-evaluation of the inadvertent waiver doctrine as a whole.
The amendment of the FRE and the numerous case law applications of the
inadvertent waiver doctrine overlook the current rationale for the
attorney–client privilege and, therefore, miss its objective.
My discussion proceeds in two main parts. Part A presents a
construction of the theoretical framework. In the first section of this part,
the current compliance-based rationale of the privilege—along with its
critique—is briefly explained before presenting the mechanics of the
inadvertent waiver doctrine. The next section conceptualizes the way
courts apply inadvertent waiver as an accident. First, the Article analyzes
the liability regimes employed by the courts, and then it describes the
unique nature of harm in this context. The Article then presents a
simplified analysis of the client’s rational reaction to the inadvertentwaiver-as-an-accident concept. The concluding section of Part A discusses
the differentiation between individual and corporate clients. Although my
discussion indicates that both types of clients end up receiving the optimal
legal advice, this Article argues that they differ with respect to the costs
they incur and this influences the demand for legal advice.
Part B addresses inadvertent waiver by lawyers. It starts by explaining
how the accident concept of the doctrine is similarly applied to inadvertent
disclosure of confidential information by lawyers. The Article then sets
out to challenge the logic of the agency theory underlying the doctrine that
imputes the lawyer’s level of care to the client. The first section describes
the moral hazard problem, which distorts the alignment of the lawyer’s
Accounting for the Costs of Electronic Discovery, 12 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 151, 158–82 (2011)
(proposing solutions to the high cost of electronic discovery). See also Frank H. Easterbrook, Insider
Trading, Secret Agents, Evidentiary Privileges, and the Production of Information, 1981 SUP. CT. REV.
309, 360 (1981) (“As a rule, we would like to hold as low as possible the resources spent bickering
over the distribution of a pile of money, when the distribution does not affect future conduct.”);
Paula Schaefer, The Future of Inadvertent Disclosure: The Lingering Need to Revise Professional Conduct
Rules, 69 MD. L. REV. 195, 200 (2010) (“The prospect of inadvertent disclosure strikes fear and
sometimes pain in the hearts of attorneys.”).
32. Rule 502 of the Federal Rules of Evidence (FRE) adopts a negligence regime, and the same
is true for Rule 26(b)(5)(B) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP), both of which also
describe some measures that must be taken to avoid the waiver of privilege with respect to
inadvertently disclosed evidence. FED. R. EVID. 502; FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(5)(B). Nevertheless, the
implementation of the standard of care is left to the courts.
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care incentives with those of the client. The following sections assert that
the lawyer’s ethical duties and his concerns about malpractice lawsuits and
reputational threats fail to correct this misalignment. The fifth section
adds another observation concerning the distortion attendant to
attributing inadvertent waiver by lawyers to their clients. The concluding
part offers policy recommendations.
II. DISCUSSION
A. The Attorney–Client Privilege and the Inadvertent Waiver Doctrine:
A Roadmap
1. Justifying the Privilege: The Compliance Rationale
Historically, justifications for the privilege ranged from noninstrumental theories to instrumental efficiency-based rationales.33
However, following the United States Supreme Court’s ruling in Upjohn
Co. v. United States,34 the prevailing justification for the privilege is
encouraging the free and frank exchange of information between the client
and the lawyer increases the incentive to seek legal advice, which in turn
generates socially-desirable compliance with norms.35 The underlying
33. For a comparative and historical discussion of the rationales, see JONATHAN AUBURN,
LEGAL PROFESSIONAL PRIVILEGE—LAW & THEORY 16–55 (Oxford 2000). See also Geoffrey C.
Hazard, Jr., A Historical Perspective on the Attorney–Client Privilege, 66 CAL. L. REV. 1061, 1069–91
(1978) (exploring the historical foundations of the attorney–client privilege); Max Radin, The
Privilege of Confidential Communications Between Lawyer and Client, 16 CAL. L. REV. 487, 490–93
(1928) (examining the historical justifications for the attorney–client privilege).
34. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981).
35. See id. at 392 (discussing the application of the narrow “control group test” to corporate
attorney–client privilege and explaining “[t]he narrow scope given the attorney–client privilege by the
court below not only makes it difficult for corporate attorneys to formulate sound advice when their
client is faced with a specific legal problem but also threatens to limit the valuable efforts of corporate
counsel to ensure their client’s compliance with the law”); see also Grace M. Giesel, Client
Responsibility for Lawyer Conduct: Examining the Agency Nature of the Lawyer-Client Relationship, 86
NEB. L. REV. 346, 380 (2007) (“This preventative effect of the privilege creates societal benefits
because this effect encourages legitimate conduct and discourages conduct contrary to law. Modern
day courts frequently espouse this instrumental rationale of the attorney–client privilege.”); JOHN
WILLIAM GERGACZ, ATTORNEY–CORPORATE CLIENT PRIVILEGE §§ 1–16 (1990) (noting the
privilege rationale “to encourage client law-abiding behavior, seems almost designed for the modern
business organization”); RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 836–37 (8th ed. 2011)
(claiming without the privilege clients will be much more guarded about what they tell their lawyers
and suggesting this might even increase the demand for studying law). For a different opinion
asserting lawyers know what to ask the client and will stop her before she communicates detrimental
information, see Ronald J. Allen et al., A Positive Theory of the Attorney-Client Privilege and the Work
Product Doctrine, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 359, 361–62 (1990) (suggesting the benefits of the attorney–
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assumption is that once the client learns the legal consequences of his
contemplated actions, the client will choose a legal rather than an illegal
course of action.36 While the privilege enables the free and frank exchange
of information between the lawyer and the client and encourages clients to
seek the advice of legal experts, some scholars note that clients who seek
legal advice do not necessarily end up pursuing legally compliant or
socially desirable courses of action.37 Hence, it is not always true that the
privilege is socially desirable.38 Nevertheless, the compliance justification
client privilege outweigh the detriments).
36. This is a common assumption about the privilege’s purpose. It is emphasized in Comment
2 to Rule 1.6 of the 2006 version of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, which states:
The client is thereby encouraged to seek legal assistance and to communicate fully and frankly
with the lawyer even as to embarrassing or legally damaging subject matter. The lawyer needs
this information to represent the client effectively and, if necessary, to advise the client to refrain
from wrongful conduct. Almost without exception, clients come to lawyers in order to
determine their rights and what is, in the complex of laws and regulations, deemed to be legal
and correct. Based upon experience, lawyers know that almost all clients follow the advice
given, and the law is upheld.
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.16 cmt. 2 (2012); see Frank H. Easterbrook, Insider
Trading, Secret Agents, Evidentiary Privileges, and the Production of Information, 1981 SUP. CT. REV.
309, 354 (1981) (“Justice Rehnquist’s opinion for the Court observed that the attorney–client
privilege exists to make people more willing to talk to their lawyers. If they know that their words
will remain confidential, they will provide more information; the more they say, the more effective
the lawyer can be; the more effective the lawyer, the more likely the client to comply with the law.”).
37. Following Professor Shavell, one should distinguish between advice about contemplated
acts, also referred to as “ex ante legal advice,” and advice about litigation that has no direct impact on
the client’s compliance decision because it is given ex post. For further discussion, see Steven Shavell,
Legal Advice, in 2 THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 516, 517
(Peter Newman ed., 1998) (distinguishing between ex ante legal advice and ex post legal advice). For
a critique of the assumption that protecting confidentiality promotes compliance, see Steven Shavell,
Legal Advice About Contemplated Acts: The Decision to Obtain Advice, Its Social Desirability, and
Protection of Confidentiality, 17 J. LEGAL STUD. 123, 134 (1988) (“Since protection of confidentiality
encourages parties to obtain legal advice, protection of confidentiality will result in socially desirable
changes in behavior if expected sanctions equal the harm that results from sanctionable acts.
However, where expected sanctions are less than the harm done by acts, legal advice and thus
protection of confidentiality may or may not lead to socially desirable behavior.”). See also Frank H.
Easterbrook, Insider Trading, Secret Agents, Evidentiary Privileges, and the Production of Information,
1981 SUP. CT. REV. 309, 363 (1981) (“[I]t is wrong to suppose that a broad privilege is needed to
ensure compliance with legal rules.”); Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Legal Advice About Information
to Present in Litigation: Its Effects and Social Desirability, 102 HARV. L. REV. 565, 614 (1989) (noting
the privilege might not be socially desirable in the litigation phase because legal advice helps
individuals avoid errors in their selection of evidence presented to the court, which helps the client to
anticipate lower sanctions and therefore the client will be more likely to commit acts that may result
in sanctions). On the ambiguity of legal advice in promoting compliance, see RICHARD POSNER,
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 808–09 (8th ed. 2011) (asserting legal advice can prevent inadvertent
incompliance with law but may also prevent inadvertent compliance).
38. See Steven Shavell, Legal Advice, in 2 THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS
AND THE LAW 516, 519 (Peter Newman ed., 1998) (claiming confidentiality matters especially “to
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for the privilege persists in spite of the theoretical challenge to its validity.
It is therefore reasonable to expect other components of the privilege,
including the inadvertent waiver doctrine, to serve and advance the
compliance rationale.
A client may waive the privilege and allow the disclosure of privileged
communications.39 The waiver can be voluntary and intentional, but may
also be the result of inadvertent disclosure of privileged material on the
part of the client or the lawyer.40 Because the privilege withholds
information from the court, courts grant it grudgingly and deny it
whenever it does not encourage the free exchange of private information
between the lawyer and the client.41 The inadvertent waiver doctrine is
supposed to serve this function. For example, if the client mistakenly
communicates privileged documents to third parties outside the scope of
the “privilege circle,” this action may be considered an inadvertent waiver
of the privilege because it undermines the premise that the client intended
the communication to be confidential.42
If privilege matters, why does the doctrine of inadvertent waiver make
sense? Many courts are reluctant to recognize the privilege and construe its

those obtaining advice subversive of the law”).
39. Rule 502 of the FRE acknowledges a client can disclose material otherwise protected by the
attorney–client privilege or the work product doctrine if the “waiver is intentional.” FED. R. EVID.
502; see Alpert v. Riley, 267 F.R.D. 202, 209 (S.D. Tex. 2010) (reiterating that voluntary disclosure
waives the attorney–client privilege); Dolin, Thomas & Solomon LLP v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 719 F.
Supp. 2d 245, 253 (W.D.N.Y. 2010) (“The privilege may be explicitly waived by the client.”);
Schanfield v. Sojitz Corp. of Am., 258 F.R.D. 211, 214 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (“It is well-established that
voluntary disclosure of confidential material to a third party waives any applicable attorney–client
privilege.”); Grace M. Giesel, Client Responsibility for Lawyer Conduct: Examining the Agency Nature of
the Lawyer-Client Relationship, 86 NEB. L. REV. 346, 384 (2007) (“[B]asic agency principles make
clear that a client certainly should be able to expressly instruct the attorney to waive the privilege.”).
40. Rule 502(b) of the FRE holds that inadvertent disclosure will be protected as long as the
following conditions apply: “(1) the disclosure is inadvertent; (2) the holder of the privilege or
protection took reasonable steps to prevent disclosure; and (3) the holder promptly took reasonable
steps to rectify the error, including (if applicable) following Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
23(b)(5)(B).” FED. R. EVID. 502(b).
41. See In re Horowitz, 482 F.2d 72, 81 (2d Cir. 1973) (holding the privilege must be “strictly
confined within the narrowest possible limits consistent with the logic of its principle” (quoting 8
WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2291 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961))); Henry v. Champlain Enters., Inc.,
212 F.R.D. 73, 83 (N.D.N.Y. 2003) (recognizing the attorney–client privilege ought to be narrowly
construed because it does withhold relevant information from the court).
42. See Steven Shavell, Legal Advice About Contemplated Acts: The Decision to Obtain Advice, Its
Social Desirability, and Protection of Confidentiality, 17 J. LEGAL STUD. 123, 144 (1988) (“[A]
person’s decision as to whether to obtain legal advice will be unlikely to be affected by the chance of
his attorney’s disclosure if he is willing to allow the presence of third parties who would not
necessarily be expected to maintain confidentiality.”).
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application narrowly.43 Therefore, they seek screening mechanisms that
will justify unveiling cloaked information that may promote the court’s
ability to reach an accurate verdict. When the privilege is asserted at trial,
the judge has no way of knowing whether the client really valued the
confidentiality of the information exchanged under the cloak of the
privilege or whether the client was taking advantage of the privilege, expost, in order to suppress evidence that may bolster the opposing party’s
claims. When a judge observes the client did not take sufficient
precautions to maintain the confidentiality of the exchanged information,
he may conclude the client placed less importance on confidentiality at the
time of the communication. It therefore follows that the absence of the
privilege would not chill the flow of information between the client and
the lawyer at that earlier point in time.44
2. Inadvertent Waiver As an Accident
Whether they do so consciously or unconsciously, courts treat
inadvertent disclosure of privileged communications as a form of accident.
This is apparent because courts often use negligence terminology in the
context of inadvertent waiver.45 This section will present a deeper analysis
of the components of inadvertent waiver as an accident.
My purpose here is to construct a stylized conceptualization of the
inadvertent waiver setting in order to incorporate insights from the
economic analysis of law. Let us begin by looking at the client in this
setting. The client is sometimes the injurer in the inadvertent waiver
accident, such as when he is careless. The lawyer may also be the injurer in
certain cases, a possibility that will be discussed later on in Part B. The
important point is that the client is always the victim of the inadvertent
waiver, regardless of the identity of the injurer, and thus, in many cases,

43. See, e.g., Henry, 212 F.R.D. at 83 (“[S]ince the privilege has the effect of withholding
relevant information from the [fact finder], it applies only where necessary to achieve its purpose.”
(citing Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 403 (1976))).
44. JOHN WILLIAM GERGACZ, ATTORNEY–CORPORATE CLIENT PRIVILEGE §§ 4–5 & 5–43
(1990).
45. See, e.g., Ares-Serono, Inc. v. Organon Int’l B.V., 160 F.R.D. 1, 4 (D. Mass. 1994)
(“Mistake or inadvertence is, after all, merely a euphemism for negligence.” (quoting Int’l Digital Sys.
Corp. v. Digital Equip. Corp., 120 F.R.D. 445, 450 (D. Mass. 1988))); see also P.T. Buntin, M.D.,
P.C. v. Becker, 727 N.E.2d 734, 741 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000) (asserting the attorney–client privilege
must be judged against a negligence standard); Grace M. Giesel, Client Responsibility for Lawyer
Conduct: Examining the Agency Nature of the Lawyer-Client Relationship, 86 NEB. L. REV. 346, 386–
87 (2007) (“In these inadvertent disclosure settings, the attorney discloses the privileged document as
the result of all sorts of activities, most of which could be classified as varying degrees of negligence.”).
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the careless client will bring on the demise of his own case.46
Courts expect the client to take care in order to minimize the
probability of an inadvertent waiver, especially if the client cares about the
privilege. Otherwise, the client bears the harm once the judge determines
the occurrence of an inadvertent waiver. I will address the nature of this
harm promptly, but first it is essential to clarify how courts determine the
liability for this so-called accident.
a. Determining Liability
When the court must decide whether there was an inadvertent
disclosure and the client is liable, it will often apply one of the three
fundamental liability regimes from tort law: strict liability, no liability, or
negligence.47 Clearly, these regimes correspond to the strict, lenient, and
balanced (or “middle of the road”) approaches—as they are referred to in
the case law.48 However, in applying the inadvertent waiver doctrine,
courts use these regimes in a different manner than in tort law. Namely,
courts use the liability regimes as a mechanism to determine whether harm
occurred, whereas in tort law, liability regimes are mechanisms to
apportion damage for an already existing harm.49
The assumption is that prior to actually communicating information to
the lawyer, the client is apprised of the need to maintain confidentiality
and thus takes precautions to avoid inadvertent disclosure.50 Given this
46. See, e.g., In re Horowitz, 482 F.2d at 81–82 (holding the client waived the attorney–client
privilege because he made no effort to preserve confidentiality of documents).
47. This is the fundamental choice offered to the social planner in tort law for the purpose of
determining the distribution of compensatory damages for a given harm. See generally STEVEN
SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 179–80 (2004) (defining the
fundamental liability regimes); Steven Shavell, Strict Liability Versus Negligence, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 1,
1 (1980) (comparing strict liability and negligence).
48. Paula Schaefer, The Future of Inadvertent Disclosure: The Lingering Need to Revise
Professional Conduct Rules, 69 MD. L. REV. 195, 213–14 (2010). There seems to be some confusion
among the courts regarding whether the standards are applied in order to determine if a disclosure
was “inadvertent” or whether an inadvertent disclosure should be considered a waiver of the privilege.
See id. at 214 (“While many consider the balancing test the fairest approach, the standard creates
substantial uncertainty regarding whether a court will ultimately determine that a particular
disclosure waived the privilege.”). This confusion is purely semantic and therefore has no implication
on my discussion.
49. By determining an accidental disclosure did not waive the privilege, the court de facto holds
the accident did not create harm.
50. See Michigan Law Review Association, Note, Inadvertent Disclosure of Documents Subject to
the Attorney–Client Privilege, 82 MICH. L. REV. 598, 600–07 (1983) (stating this supposition befits
sophisticated corporate clients more than it does individual clients; however, in the case of individual
clients it is sufficient to address a case in which the client learns about the need to protect the
confidentiality of the communications once he begins the interaction with the lawyer).
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assumption, the client’s investment in precautionary measures will depend
on the court’s pre-existing choice of liability regime. Under a strict
liability regime, any accidental disclosure is considered a waiver of the
privilege,51 whereas under a negligence regime a standard of care is defined
and waiver of the privilege occurs only when the client fails to invest
sufficiently in securing the confidentiality of the communications—
thereby failing to maintain the required standard of care.52

51. See Alan J. Meese, Inadvertent Waiver of the Attorney-Client Privilege by Disclosure of
Documents: An Economic Analysis, 23 CREIGHTON L. REV. 513, 521 (1990) (explaining that strict
liability, also referred to as “strict responsibility,” is the traditional approach attributed initially to
Dean Wigmore); see, e.g., Minebea Co., Ltd. v. Papst, 228 F.R.D. 34, 34 (D.D.C. 2005) (noting
there are some authorities supporting the placement of strict liability on the client for the loss of
privilege even if the loss is due to circumstances not entirely in the client’s direct control, such as theft
of the documents or wire-tapping); id. at 35 (“If a client wished to preserve the privilege, it must treat
the confidentiality of attorney–client communications like jewel—if not crown jewels.” (quoting In re
Sealed Case, 877 F.2d 976, 980 (D.C. Cir. 1989))); Ares-Serono, Inc. v. Organon Int’l B.V., 160
F.R.D. 1, 4 (D. Mass. 1994) (“In this district, disclosure of documents subject to an [attorney–client]
privilege operates as a waiver ‘to any documents disclosed by inadvertence.’” (quoting Int’l Digital
Sys. Corp. v. Digital Equip. Corp., 120 F.R.D. 445, 450 (D. Mass. 1988))) (internal punctuation
omitted); Fed. Deposit Ins. Co. v. Singh, 140 F.R.D. 252, 253 (D. Me. 1992) (“[W]hen a document
is disclosed, even inadvertently, it is no longer held in confidence despite the intentions of the party.”
(citing In re Sealed Case, 877 F.2d at 980)); Wichita Land & Cattle Co. v. Am. Fed. Bank, F.S.B.,
148 F.R.D. 456, 457 (D.D.C. 1992) (“Disclosure of otherwise-privileged materials, even where the
disclosure was inadvertent, serves as a waiver of the privilege.”); see also JOHN WILLIAM GERGACZ,
ATTORNEY–CORPORATE CLIENT PRIVILEGE 5–44 (1990) (claiming there may be a distinction
between “unintentional” disclosure and “involuntary” disclosure: the latter is caused by a third party
and is perceived to be outside the control of the client or the lawyer). See generally Michigan Law
Review Association, Note, Inadvertent Disclosure of Documents Subject to the Attorney–Client Privilege,
82 MICH. L. REV. 598, 612–14 (1983) (differentiating between the effects of voluntary disclosure
and involuntary disclosure); Alan J. Meese, Inadvertent Waiver of the Attorney-Client Privilege by
Disclosure of Documents: An Economic Analysis, 23 CREIGHTON L. REV. 513, 531 (1990) (supporting
this distinction by asserting involuntary disclosure should not justify inadvertent waiver insofar as
contributory negligence is not a defence against an intentional tort); id. (declaring this approach
would eliminate the extension of the attorney’s inadvertent disclosure to his client because from the
client’s perspective such a disclosure would be involuntary); id. (stating this rationale does not fit
technological developments that enable attorneys and clients to communicate large volumes of
information easily over electronic networks and web-based storage facilities with higher risks of
exposure to third parties and to leaks, thereby making it reasonable to expect the client and the
attorney to take precautions against such risks); Natalie A. Kanellis, Comment, Applicability of the
Attorney–Client Privilege to Communications Intercepted by Third Parties, 69 IOWA L. REV. 263, 263–
64 (1983) (exploring the attorney–client privilege within the context of discovery communicated by a
third party and distinguishing the traditional view, which stipulates that the communication is not
privileged, and the modern trend, which holds that the privilege remains).
52. See, e.g., Int’l Digital Sys. Corp., 120 F.R.D. at 450 (holding that when confidentiality is
lost through inadvertent waiver, there is no need for the court to examine the adequacy of the
precautions taken to avoid the waiver); Suburban Sew & Sweep v. Swiss-Bernina, 91 F.R.D. 254,
254–55 (N.D. Ill. 1981) (finding the client was negligent for not destroying a draft document that
was retrieved by the opponent from a trash-bin).
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Drawing analogies from the economics of tort liability regimes to
inadvertent waiver is quite straightforward, but nevertheless yields some
important observations that have thus far escaped attention. Economic
analysis shows the application of a strict liability regime is relatively
problem-free from a judge’s perspective.53 Accordingly, strict liability will
be significantly more cost-effective for courts.54 Under strict liability,
whenever the court observes an inadvertent disclosure, it will assume the
client has waived the privilege regardless of the actual investment in
precautions.55 When this is the case, the classic economics of tort law
yield the conclusion that the client always chooses the socially efficient
investment in precaution. This is because, under strict liability, the client
bears the full cost of the harm caused by inadvertent waiver.56 On the
other hand, applying a strict liability regime means activity levels will be
restricted; the free exchange of information between the client and the
lawyer will be limited as if it were an environmentally hazardous activity,
such as operation of a nuclear power plant.57
As it turns out, however, the negligence regime is the most common
among the courts when applying the inadvertent waiver doctrine.58 From
an economic perspective, this is at odds with the courts’ best interest.
From a judge’s perspective, the negligence regime is costlier because it
compels the court to develop a standard of care against which the client’s
53. RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 229 (8th ed. 2011) (explaining strict
liability cases are simpler to try and therefore “we can expect litigation costs to be lower under strict
liability than under negligence”).
54. See Steven S. Gensler, Some Thoughts on the Lawyer’s E-volving Duties in Discovery, 36 N.
KY. L. REV. 521, 524 (2009) (arguing the court’s costs are not a trivial matter because the original
drafters of the FRCP did not include extensive rules for the court management of discovery
proceedings, instead assuming it would be a self-executing process that would not involve the court).
55. See Alan J. Meese, Inadvertent Waiver of the Attorney-Client Privilege by Disclosure of
Documents: An Economic Analysis, 23 CREIGHTON L. REV. 513, 521–23 (1990) (describing how the
privilege is waived under the strict liability approach, regardless of the intent).
56. RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 226 (8th ed. 2011) (describing the
assumptions courts make when dealing with inadvertent disclosure); STEVEN SHAVELL,
FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF TORT LAW 196 (2004) (noting strict liability means
the victim bears the cost of any accident that could not be efficiently prevented).
57. See RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 228 (8th ed. 2011) (describing the
effect a strict liability standard will have on all communication between attorneys and their clients);
STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF TORT LAW 196 (2004) (relaying
how imposition of a strict liability standard affects the attorney–client relationship).
58. Paula Schaefer, The Future of Inadvertent Disclosure: The Lingering Need to Revise
Professional Conduct Rules, 69 MD. L. REV. 195, 214 (2010) (describing the different factors courts
use in employing the negligence standard); see Alan J. Meese, Inadvertent Waiver of the Attorney-Client
Privilege by Disclosure of Documents: An Economic Analysis, 23 CREIGHTON L. REV. 513, 523–26
(1990) (referring to the “conduct” approach).
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behavior will be measured.59 Furthermore, when a dispute arises as to
whether inadvertently disclosed information resulted in a waiver of the
privilege, litigation concerning whether the standard of care was met
necessarily ensues. This entails more judicial resources being spent
adjudicating the waiver dispute under the negligence regime.60
Nevertheless, if courts view furthering communications between clients
and their lawyers to be a socially desirable goal, then negligence is superior
to strict liability because it does not inhibit the activity level of client–
lawyer communication.
Under the negligence regime, much depends on the court’s ability to set
an accurate standard of care.61 Additionally, in order to produce efficient
compliance, a standard of care must be certain, easily identifiable, and
easily adhered to by its addressees (the courts and the clients). This is not
the case with respect to inadvertent waiver. It is hard to discern a single
59. See, e.g., U.S. Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Liberty Surplus Ins. Corp., 630 F. Supp. 2d 1332,
1340–41 (M.D. Fla. 2007) (examining internal procedures in a law firm and holding that it
inadvertently waived the privilege by sending documents to opposing counsel after a paralegal did not
follow an attorney’s instructions and another attorney at the firm signed off on the list of produced
documents); Commonwealth v. Allison, 751 N.E.2d 868, 889 (Mass. 2001) (detailing a standard of
care for office-sharing attorneys by holding they must maintain separate fax machines or install other
procedures to safeguard client confidentiality).
60. Cf. Atronic Intern., GMBH v. SAI Semispecialists of Am., Inc., 232 F.R.D. 160, 166
(E.D.N.Y. 2005) (ruling there was no evidence of reasonable procedures for separating confidential
communications from non-privileged communications); In re Reorganization of Elec. Mut. Liab. Ins.
Co. (Bermuda), 681 N.E.2d 838, 841 (Mass. 1997) (holding the fact that a document was stolen
suggests insufficient precautions were taken, but the presumption can be contradicted if the party
proves sufficient precautions were taken); JOHN WILLIAM GERGACZ, ATTORNEY–CORPORATE
CLIENT PRIVILEGE 5–35 (1990) (“It just takes those courts a little longer since the documentscreening procedures are elaborately dissected and their failings laid bare.”).
61. If the court chooses a negligence regime, the rational client will try to minimize potential
harm from inadvertent waiver by taking the precautions that meet the court-determined standard of
care. Alan J. Meese, Inadvertent Waiver of the Attorney-Client Privilege by Disclosure of Documents: An
Economic Analysis, 23 CREIGHTON L. REV. 513, 538–40 (1990). Each court might do one of three
things: (i) set an efficient standard of care from a social welfare calculus, (ii) set a suboptimal
standard, or (iii) set a standard that is above the optimal level. Id. If the court sets a socially efficient
standard, the client will do her utmost to adhere to this standard and thereby avoid liability. Id. If
the court sets a standard above the socially efficient standard of care, then the client’s behavior
depends on her expected total costs. These would consist of the client’s precaution cost and her
expected harm in the event that inadvertent waiver occurs. Id. If the client’s total costs at the
efficient care level are higher than the cost of care under the court-determined standard, the client
will choose the court’s standard. Id. However, if the cost of care under the court-determined
standard of care is higher than the sum of the cost of socially efficient care and expected harm, then
the client’s best strategy would be to disregard the court’s standard and opt for the socially efficient
level of care. If the court sets a suboptimal standard of care, the rational client will adhere to this low
standard because this would be sufficient to avoid liability, but too many inadvertent waivers will
occur. Id.
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standard of care from the multitude of cases applying the inadvertent
waiver doctrine.62 Consequently, clients that face multiple litigation
proceedings in various courts or jurisdictions—and clients that do not
know in advance what jurisdiction they are likely to litigate in—face a
vague standard. This implies clients will prefer to wastefully over-invest in
precautions in order to make sure they meet the standard of care.
The adoption of FRE 502 was an attempt to directly confront and
resolve the confusion caused by the lack of a uniform liability regime.63
FRE 502 adopted the balanced approach—namely, a negligence regime.64
It aimed to enhance predictability by adopting standards for recognizing
inadvertent waiver, but it failed to achieve uniformity because different
courts may still demand different precautions, and, thus, may vary in their
standards of care. Hence, the legislature did not resolve the uncertainty
with respect to the standard of care.65
b. Determining Harm
We are now prepared to address the issue of harm, the last and least
analyzed component of the inadvertent waiver mechanism. Here, the
economic analysis of the inadvertent waiver doctrine parts ways with the
classic economic analysis of accidents. In tort law, the judge presumes
harm and then determines the level of compensation (the amount of
damages imposed on the liable party) vis-à-vis that exogenously given
harm.66 The court cannot influence the magnitude of the harm in an
62. See id. at 540–42 (outlining problems with a variety of standards of care).
63. See Explanatory Note on Evidence Rule 502 Prepared by the Judicial Conference Advisory
Committee on Evidence Rules (Revised Nov. 28, 2007), Congressional Record—Senate, S1317
(Feb. 27, 2008) (pointing out that FRE Rule 502 “responds to the widespread complaint that
litigation costs necessary to protect against waiver of attorney–client privilege or work product have
become prohibitive due to the concern that any disclosure (however innocent or minimal) will
operate as a subject matter waiver of all protected communications or information” and that “the rule
seeks to provide a predictable, uniform set of standards under which parties can determine the
consequences of a disclosure of a communication or information covered by the attorney–client
privilege or [work product] protection”).
64. See id. (explaining “the rule opts for the middle ground” and inadvertent disclosure would
not constitute a waiver “if the holder took reasonable steps to prevent disclosure and also promptly
took reasonable steps to rectify the error”).
65. See Paula Schaefer, The Future of Inadvertent Disclosure: The Lingering Need to Revise
Professional Conduct Rules, 69 MD. L. REV. 195, 214–20 (2010) (professing “many consider the
balancing test the fairest approach[,]” but also that “the standard creates substantial uncertainty
regarding whether a court will ultimately determine that a particular disclosure waived the privilege”
and further explaining “the new FRE 502(b) approach incorporates the same uncertainty and
possibility of waiver that exists in balancing jurisdictions”).
66. Cf. Michigan Law Review Association, Note, Inadvertent Disclosure of Documents Subject to
the Attorney–Client Privilege, 82 MICH. L. REV. 598, 604 (1983) (describing the attorney’s liability
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accident, but it can decide whether to fully compensate, undercompensate, or over-compensate the injured party. As opposed to regular
tort law cases, inadvertent waiver is actually an accident only when the
court makes a decision to that effect. Once it establishes the occurrence of
an inadvertent waiver, the court is in a position to determine the
magnitude of the harm. Hence, the court controls the scope of the
damage caused by the waiver.67 In spite of the enormous implications of
the harm decision on the behavior of potential litigants, this component of
the doctrine has only been recognized recently by the newly added Rule
502(a) of the FRE, although this component was no less lacking in
uniformity than its counterparts. Taxonomy of the relevant case law
reveals three major rules governing the level of harm courts impose on
litigants pursuant to an inadvertent waiver of the privilege.
The lenient harm rule adopted by some courts means the scope of the
waiver applies only to the specific information that was inadvertently
disclosed, whereas the rest of the privileged communications remain
shielded.68
The tough harm rule has some variations of increasing severity. In the
mildest and most common form, even inadvertent disclosure of some of
the privileged material will result in a waiver of the privilege to all
communications between the client and the lawyer pertaining to the
subject matter of the disclosed information.69 When accidental disclosure
for inadvertent disclosure through tort law).
67. Id. at 598–600 (explaining how the liability of the attorney who inadvertently discloses
material varies depending on how the court, in its discretion, views the level of harm done to the
client).
68. This is mostly the case with respect to inadvertent disclosure of material protected by the
work product privilege. See, e.g., Cont’l Cas. Co. v. Under Armour, Inc., 537 F. Supp. 2d 761, 773–
74 (D. Md. 2008) (holding inadvertent disclosure of work product should not necessarily result in
subject matter waiver); see also In re EchoStar Commc’ns Corp., 448 F.3d 1294, 1301 (Fed. Cir.
2006) (noting the work product privilege may belong to the lawyer rather than the client and
sometimes cannot be waived by the client at all).
69. The mild version of the tough harm rule seems to be the prevalent rule in case law. See,
e.g., Fort James Corp. v. Solo Cup Co., 412 F.3d 1340, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (holding waiver
extends beyond the document initially produced); Texaco Puerto Rico, Inc. v. Dep’t of Consumer
Affairs, 60 F.3d 867, 883–84 (1st Cir. 1995) (extending inadvertent disclosure to all
communications that involve the same subject matter); E.I. Dupont de Nemours & Co. v. Kolon
Indus., Inc., 269 F.R.D. 600, 609 (E.D. Va. 2010) (declaring a manufacturer’s statement to the press
waived its work product privilege to a certain extent); Navajo Nation v. Peabody Holding Co., 255
F.R.D. 37, 48 (D.D.C. 2009) (holding any disclosure of attorney–client material will apply to all
communications relating to the same subject matter); In re EchoStar Commc’ns Corp., 448 F.3d at
1299 (asserting waiver applied to all subject matter communications); In re Natural Gas Commodity
Litig., 229 F.R.D. 82, 85 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (extending waiver to documents inadvertently produced
when extreme carelessness is demonstrated); Duplan Corp. v. Deering Milliken, 397 F. Supp. 1146,
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occurs in the course of ongoing litigation, this version of inadvertent
waiver might be limited to the specific legal dispute within which it
occurred. However, if the accidental disclosure of privileged ex-ante legal
advice occurred before any litigation, the inadvertent waiver might apply
to all potential litigation in which the discovery of the privileged
communications will be ordered—and thus result in a much harsher
outcome for the client. Furthermore, in its most damaging variation, the
inadvertent disclosure will entail the waiver of the privilege with regard to
all the information communicated between the client and the lawyer
covered by the same type of privilege.70
As opposed to the two rules above, some courts adopt a no harm rule,
which stipulates that inadvertent waiver is not an accident at all.71
Courts can increase the harm inflicted by both the lenient and the tough
rules if they determine the disclosed information will be available to third
parties to the specific litigation at hand.72 Especially under the tough
harm rule, this might have significant repercussions for the client,
extending beyond the scope of a specific litigation.
A numerical example can serve to clarify the rules. Assume a client is
required to communicate one hundred documents to his lawyer for the
purpose of preparing for litigation, and that thirty of the documents satisfy
the criteria of the attorney–client privilege and therefore should not be
disclosed in pretrial discovery. Now, assume that if the client complies
with the socially efficient standard of care, he will accidentally disclose ten
percent of the documents he communicated to the lawyer. Hence, the
1161 (D.S.C. 1975) (stating the mild version of the tough harm rule appears to be the prevalent rule
in case law).
70. No authorities were found to this effect; hence, this is merely a theoretical possibility.
71. There are very few cases that apply the no harm rule, and most of them concern waiver by
attorneys, as discussed infra Part B (“The Inadvertent Waiver Doctrine as Applied to Lawyers”). An
often-cited example is Harold Sampson Children’s Trust v. Linda Gale Sampson 1979 Trust, in which
the court held that an attorney, without the consent or knowledge of a client, cannot voluntarily
waive the privilege by producing privileged documents if the attorney does not recognize that the
documents are privileged. Harold Sampson Children’s Trust v. Linda Gale Sampson 1979 Trust,
679 N.W.2d 794, 803 (Wis. 2004). In this case, the waiver occurred in the process of discovery,
prior to litigation over a real estate transaction. Id. at 796. The attorney disclosed the privileged
material because he was unaware of the client’s privilege with respect to the material. Id. The client
was not consulted prior to the disclosure. Id. After the attorney resigned, a new attorney noticed the
disclosure and petitioned the court to undo the disclosure. Id. Finding that “only the client can
waive the attorney–client privilege,” the court ordered the documents be returned to the client as
privileged. Id. at 803.
72. See, e.g., Hopson v. City of Balt., 232 F.R.D. 228, 229 (D. Md. 2005) (noting a risk of
waiver exists in subsequent litigation against a different party, even if current parties agreed
inadvertent disclosure would not result in waiver).
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client will accidentally disclose three of the privileged documents. When
opposing counsel discovers the inadvertently disclosed documents, he will
assert inadvertent waiver with respect to all of the client’s privileged
attorney–client communications. Under strict liability, the court will
order the production of the privileged material regardless of the investment
in care. If the court applies the tough harm rule, the client will be
compelled to disclose all thirty privileged documents, whereas under the
lenient harm rule, the privilege will be lost only with respect to the three
documents that were accidentally disclosed. If the negligence standard is
applied, the client will try to prove he abided by the requisite standard of
care and should not be subjected to any of the consequences of the
inadvertent waiver. The judge will have to rule whether an inadvertent
waiver occurred and what consequences will follow. Should the court find
the client complied with the standard of care, it would rule there was no
waiver of the privilege. Otherwise, the court will apply one of the
standards of harm.
Rule 502(a) of the FRE aimed to address the distressing uncertainty of
the harm component by adopting the lenient harm rule. According to the
FRE 502(a), “the waiver extends to an undisclosed communication or
information in a federal or state proceeding only if: (1) the waiver is
intentional; (2) the disclosed and undisclosed communications or
information concern the same subject matter; and (3) they ought in
fairness to be considered together.”73
The requirement of intent seems to restrict the defined scope of the
waiver in FRE 502(a) to voluntary waivers rather than inadvertent
waivers.74 This language conflicts with the legislative intent as expressed
by the Senate Committee of the Judiciary, which stated:
The bill provides a new Federal Rule of Evidence 502 to limit the
consequences of inadvertent disclosure, thereby relieving litigants of the
burden that a single mistake during the discovery process can cost them the
protection of a privilege. It provides that if there is a waiver of privilege, it
applies only to the specific information disclosed and not the broader subject
matter unless the holder has intentionally used the privileged information in
a misleading fashion.75

On top of this ambiguity, the inclusion of a fairness consideration in
73. FED. R. EVID. 502(a).
74. See id. (requiring the waiver be intentional if it is to extend to undisclosed communication
and information).
75. S. REP. NO. 110-264, at 3 (2008), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CRPT110srpt264/pdf/CRPT-110srpt264.pdf.
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FRE 502(a)(3) increases its vagueness. Furthermore, even if FRE 502(a)
applies to inadvertent waiver, it provides only a partial solution, assuming
it is not adopted by state courts.
In summation, the courts possess strong influence over the incentives to
invest in care against inadvertent waiver through their ability to determine
the combined liability regime, standard of care, and scope of judicially
imposed harm.
3. An Analysis of Client Behavior Under the Liability and Harm Rules
The previous part outlined the liability regimes and the rules governing
the imposition of harm resulting from inadvertent waiver by the client.
With respect to these rules, this framework enables a conceptualization of
the rational reaction of clients who seek legal advice.
When a client turns to his lawyer for legal advice when contemplating a
certain course of action, i.e., ex-ante legal advice, he should supply the
lawyer with information necessary for the lawyer to be able to render her
advice based on the relevant facts of the case.76 In potential future
litigation, the information communicated to the lawyer may be either
detrimental or favorable to the client’s case. The client’s interest is that the
attorney–client privilege will shield against the requirement to disclose
information deemed harmful to the client’s case in the event of future
litigation.77 Similarly, when a client faces litigation and turns to his
lawyer for legal representation, he should supply the lawyer with
information about the case so the lawyer will be able to mount the client’s
claim or defense and also be prepared for the opposing party’s counter
argument. The facts supplied by the client to his lawyer may be
detrimental or favorable to his case. If the facts are detrimental, the lawyer
and the client will try to avoid disclosure of these facts in pretrial discovery
by asserting the lawyer–client privilege.78
76. See United States v. Robinson, 121 F.3d 971, 975 (5th Cir. 1997) (“[A] client will not be
less likely to show his lawyer important documents, because those documents do not become more
easily discoverable by their revelation to the lawyer.”).
77. See, e.g., State ex rel. Polytech, Inc. v. Voorhees, 895 S.W.2d 13, 14 (Mo. 1995) (en banc)
(”Where disclosure of ‘privileged material’ is alleged, prohibition is available, since an erroneous
disclosure ‘cannot be repaired on appeal.’” (quoting State ex rel. Peabody Coal Co. v. Clark, 863
S.W.2d 604, 608–09 (Mo. 1993) (en banc))).
78. See Daniel Northrop, The Attorney–Client Privilege and Information Disclosed to an Attorney
with the Intention That the Attorney Draft a Document to Be Released to Third Parties: Public Policy
Calls for at Least the Strictest Application of the Attorney–Client Privilege, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 1481,
1492 (2009) (“Unlike other evidentiary rules that exclude evidence because it is unreliable or does
not otherwise aid in the search for truth, privileges expressly subordinate the goal of truth seeking to
other societal interests.”).
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In many cases, the client does not know the probative value of the
information or the evidence communicated to the lawyer. This ignorance
may be due to the client’s lack of expertise in legal matters or due to the
magnitude of information that needs to be communicated to the lawyer.
In the latter case, even a client with legal knowledge simply cannot afford
to sift through all the information in order to suppress the material he
deems to be detrimental.
Even if the client could identify and separate the detrimental
information from the rest of the useful data, he would be ill advised to
suppress the former when communicating with his attorney. When
seeking legal advice about contemplated actions, the client should be
interested in sharing potentially detrimental information with the lawyer in
order to receive legal advice regarding the consequences of potentially
illegal actions. Similarly, when a client is seeking ex-post legal advice
about how to present his case in litigation, it is often valuable for the
lawyer to know the weaknesses of the case in order to develop
counterclaims rather than be surprised by the opponent in court. Thus, it
makes little sense for the client to invest efforts in determining the value of
the information communicated to his lawyer or to suppress detrimental
information while communicating with his lawyer if the client wishes to
obtain optimal legal advice.
For simplicity, let us assume that information communicated by the
client to his lawyer—i.e., facts and documents—comes in the form of
discrete units—e.g., single page documents—and that they are
communicated one unit at a time.79 Another important assumption, as
explained above, is that the client either does not know or is unable to
ascertain in advance whether each unit of information supports his claim
or is negative, and therefore is adverse to his claim and supports the
opponent’s claim. Once the lawyer reviews this information, she can
inform the client whether the information is positive or negative. After the
client learns which units of information are positive and which are
79. This is oversimplified, of course. In reality, at least in some cases, all the information that
needs to be reviewed by the lawyer can be attached to a single email. However, in the process of
litigation or in an effort to obtain legal advice on complicated issues lawyers and their clients do
exchange multiple emails with varying amounts of attachments as well as numerous telephone calls,
fax messages, etc. My focus here is only on communications that may be privileged. See generally
Anette C. Wilson & Edward D. Brown, Attorney–Client Privilege and Duty of Confidentiality:
Distinction and Application, COLO. LAW., Jan. 2002, at 97, 98 (“Because the privilege protects certain
communications and not facts, per se, pre-existing documents and items that would be discoverable if
held in the client’s possession, such as tax returns, will not gain privileged protection if merely placed
in the attorney’s possession.”).
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negative, he will only present the positive evidence in court or direct his
lawyer to do so. It is also important for the sake of argument to assume
that all the information is shielded by the attorney–client privilege so that
the client can avoid the disclosure of negative information in the pretrial
discovery phase, unless an inadvertent waiver takes place.
If the rational client wishes to avoid an inadvertent waiver, he must
invest in precautions. For example, the client should double-check the
lawyer’s email address prior to sending an email containing information.
Another precaution is sending physical documents in secured files or sealed
boxes to the lawyer’s office by a trustworthy messenger. The simple act of
going to the lawyer’s office for a consultation as opposed to having a
conversation in a public place, such as a café, is another form of
precaution.80
Because the client will probably present positive information in court,
he should not be concerned if such information is accidentally disclosed.
However, because the client does not know whether the privileged
information communicated to his lawyer is positive or detrimental to his
case, he must invest in precautions to prevent any accidental disclosure.81
The reason for this is simple: unless the court adopts a version of the
lenient harm rule, the disclosure of any privileged information—even if the
disclosed information is positive from the client’s perspective—may be
held to be an inadvertent waiver and result in the compelled production of
all privileged attorney–client communications.82
Consider a situation in which one document is accidentally disclosed
and the judge holds this disclosure constitutes an inadvertent waiver.
Under the lenient harm rule, if the inadvertently disclosed information is
not adverse evidence, then the client will suffer no harm as a result of the
80. Limiting the circle of persons exposed to privileged attorney–client communications is a
frequently used confidentiality precaution easily observed by the court. Additionally, privileged
information can be labeled as such and filed or kept separately from non-privileged material with
password-protected access, encryption, or other measures that limit the risk of exposure to persons
outside the privilege circle.
81. See Anette C. Wilson & Edward D. Brown, Attorney–Client Privilege and Duty of
Confidentiality: Distinction and Application, COLO. LAW., Jan. 2002, at 97, 101 (“[A]ttorneys must
be sensitive to disclosures of confidential information made to third parties. Disclosure to a third
party constitutes a waiver of any confidentiality protection that may exist with such communications,
and perhaps the underlying subject matter, unless the third party is a privileged third party.”).
82. See Elizabeth King, Waving Goodbye to Waiver? Not So Fast: Inadvertent Disclosure, Waiver
of the Attorney–Client Privilege, and Federal Rule of Evidence 502, 32 CAMPBELL L. REV. 467, 472
(2010) (“In order for an inadvertent disclosure to be considered a de facto court-compelled
production that would not result in the waiver of the attorney–client privilege, a court must have
compelled the holder of the privilege to produce an extraordinarily high volume of documents within
an extremely short period of time.”).
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accidental disclosure because the rest of the information will remain
privileged. Hence, if we assume the information communicated between
the lawyer and the client is equally likely to be positive or negative, then in
half of all accidental disclosures, the client will probably suffer no harm.
Under the tough harm rule, after determining that inadvertent waiver
occurred, the judge will compel the production of all privileged
information—including adverse information not accidentally disclosed.
Therefore, the client will always suffer harm, even if the inadvertently
disclosed document was initially harmless.83
Thus, the client’s incentives to invest in care are influenced by the
choice of liability regime and the potential harm that he expects to bear.84
The liability regime is the main influence on the care incentives, whereas
the choice of the harm rule by the judge can serve to reduce or enhance the
effect of the liability regime. Under the tough harm rule, the expected
harm is higher; therefore, the client’s willingness to invest in care should
increase. Naturally, the choice of harm rule will be more influential when
the court adopts a strict liability regime for inadvertent waiver rather than
when it adopts a negligence regime, because under the former the client is
the residual bearer of the harm. Theoretically, the residual harm should
deter clients from seeking too much legal advice. Under the negligence
regime, a client can avoid the harm altogether by adhering to the standard
of care.
The inadvertent waiver doctrine thus turns the act of seeking legal
advice into a risky activity for clients who care about the privilege. The
rational client will have to consider the potential cost of the waiver with
the expected outcome from seeking legal advice.
Equipped with this knowledge, it is possible to rethink the effects of the
privilege mechanism on the way in which clients obtain legal advice. But
before doing so, some additional simplifying assumptions are required in
order to conceptualize the way in which clients derive value from legal
advice. The client’s benefit from legal advice increases with the amount of
information that he communicates to the lawyer, because a betterinformed lawyer can provide more accurate—and therefore more
83. See generally id. at 475 (describing the irreversible effects of an inadvertent waiver of
privileged information).
84. Regardless of which liability regime is chosen by the court, the lenient harm rule is superior
to the tough harm rule from the client’s perspective whenever more than one unit of information is
communicated between the client and the lawyer, or whenever they communicate more than once.
Of course, the client’s investment in care will also depend on his beliefs regarding the ratio of positive
and negative units of information. The client should be willing to invest more in precautions if he
believes that most of the communicated information is detrimental to his case.
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valuable—legal advice. However, the marginal benefit to the client from
each additional unit of information communicated to the lawyer decreases
with each additional unit communicated. At a certain point, the lawyer
forms the fundamental contours of her advice, and additional information
may improve its accuracy but will not change it. Further along the
continuum, the communication of additional volumes of information will
be counterproductive for all involved parties.85
Legal fees will be ignored for the purpose of this intellectual exercise,
such that the focus will be on the cost of precautions against inadvertent
waiver, which are costly.86 Assume each discretely communicated unit of
information requires an investment in care to secure its confidentiality.
The total cost of care is therefore a linear function, which increases as the
amount of information the client wishes to communicate grows. Once
precautions are factored into the equation, the client should not be willing
to transmit information to the lawyer if the marginal increase in the value
derived from legal advice based on the additional unit of communicated
information is lower than the marginal increase in the cost of care required
for maintaining confidentiality. This can be illustrated graphically:

85. At this point, the lawyer will be overwhelmed by too much information, most of which will
be irrelevant. This might cause the lawyer to render inaccurate advice due to her inability to sift
through all the information and focus on the relevant pieces of data.
86. For the sake of simplicity, I assume the process of transmitting information to the lawyer is
costless for the client. In reality, the act of communicating with the lawyer in itself takes time and
investment, but these costs do not alter my conclusions, and therefore, they can be disregarded.
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Graph 1
The curve denoted by v(x) reflects the value of the legal advice to the
client as a function of the amount of information (x) received by the
lawyer. The value increases with the amount of information, but at a
decreasing rate.87 The cx function depicts the costs incurred by the client
for securing the confidentiality of the information communicated to the
lawyer. While the amount of information x* yields more accurate, and
thus more valuable, legal advice, it wipes out a bigger portion of the
client’s value from the legal advice because the client must spend more on
care. Hence, a rational client will settle for less accurate legal advice based
only on the amount of information denoted by x because at this point the
net gains from the legal advice are at their maximum.
The graphical illustration underscores the fact that the amount of
information communicated to the lawyer will not be the optimal amount
when precaution costs are taken into account. Consequently, legal advice
might not be the most accurate advice the client could obtain.88
87. This curve has a maximum because at a certain point, the amount of information will
overload the lawyer and she will not be able to render the optimal advice because of her inability to
locate and focus only on the information relevant to the case.
88. See Great Am. Ins. Co. v. Smith, 574 S.W.2d 379, 384–85 (Mo. 1978) (“Some of the
advice given by the attorney may be based on information obtained from sources other than the
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One weakness of this simplified model is that an unsophisticated client
who does not know in advance whether evidence is detrimental is also
likely to be ignorant of the exact point beyond which it would not make
sense to communicate more information to his lawyer. This weakness is
further compounded by the fact that in the process of rendering legal
advice, information is often provided first and the advice is given later,
with a time lag between the two points. Hence, the client usually learns
the value of the legal advice only long after his decision is made regarding
how much information to communicate to the lawyer. In reality,
imperfect information about the nature of the data should go hand-inhand with imperfect information about the optimal amount of data that
should be communicated. As in other aspects of the privilege, in this
aspect there is a difference between one-shot clients and sophisticated
repeat players.
4. Interim Conclusions: A Focus on Corporate Clients
Several interim conclusions emerge about the application of the
inadvertent waiver doctrine to clients, before differentiating between types
of clients.
First of all, if courts believe the privilege promotes seeking legal advice
and that confidential legal advice is desirable, then adopting the strict
liability regime is not a good strategy. Strict liability causes clients to
reduce their activity level and will therefore curb the tendency to seek legal
advice.89 However, there is no such thing as too much legal advice—at
least in theory. Theoretically, enforcement and sanctions for breaching
norms are set at the socially optimal level so that legal advice will always
induce compliant and socially desirable behavior.90

client. Some of what the attorney says will not actually be advice as to a course of conduct to be
followed. Part may be analysis of what is known to date of the situation. Part may be a discussion of
additional avenues to be pursued. Part may be keeping the client advised of things done or opinions
formed to date. All of these communications, not just the advice, are essential elements of attorney–
client consultation. All should be protected.”).
89. See John C. Coffee Jr., Gatekeeper Failure and Reform: The Challenge of Fashioning Relevant
Reforms, 84 B.U. L. REV. 301, 306 (2004) (“[B]ecause gatekeepers have reduced relevance, they also
have reduced leverage with their clients.”). See generally Elizabeth King, Waving Goodbye to Waiver?
Not So Fast: Inadvertent Disclosure, Waiver of the Attorney–Client Privilege, and Federal Rule of
Evidence, 32 CAMPBELL L. REV. 467, 502 (2010) (discussing the effects that a strict approach to
waiver will have on attorney–client privilege).
90. See John C. Coffee Jr., The Attorney As Gatekeeper: An Agenda for the SEC, 103 COLUM. L.
REV. 1293, 1308 (2003) (explaining gatekeeper obligations can produce socially desirable outcomes).
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As a second-best solution, courts adopting the strict liability regime for
inadvertent waiver should opt for the lenient harm rule to reduce the risk
side of legal advice. The same recommendation applies to courts that
employ the negligence regime, although the effect would likely be
significantly lower because clients who adhere to the court’s standard of
care are not affected by this change.
In addition, reducing the cost of care against inadvertent waiver will
result in an improvement in the quality of legal advice. This conclusion
holds regardless of the chosen liability regime. Notably, reducing the cost
of care does not necessarily require the courts lower their applicable
standard of care. Technological developments can also reduce the cost of
taking precautions while maintaining or even improving the level of
care.91
For example, when clients communicate volumes of information, the
durability of precautionary mechanisms matters.92 The analysis so far
assumed precautions were non-durable by nature.
Non-durable
precautions are measures that must be taken with respect to each and every
unit of information communicated by the client, so that a cost must be
incurred for each and every unit. For instance, the time-consuming action
of encrypting each confidential document before emailing it is a nondurable precaution.93 Conversely, a durable precaution would include
investing in an encrypted phone line between the client’s office and the
lawyer’s office, protecting all of their conversations from unwanted
intruders.94
91. See George L. Paul & Jason R. Baron, Information Inflation: Can the Legal System Adapt?,
13 RICHMOND J.L. & TECH. 10, 36 (2007) (“There simply is too much information now, for old
standards of inadvertent waiver to apply.”); Jessica Wang, Note, Nonwaiver Agreements After Federal
Rule of Evidence 502: A Glance at Quick Peek and Clawback Agreements, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1835,
1842 (2009) (relaying that discovery rules were designed to fit paper discovery and not e-discovery,
thereby creating “disastrous” costs); Donald Wochna, Electronic Data, Electronic Searching,
Inadvertent Production of Privileged Data: A Perfect Storm, 43 AKRON L. REV. 847, 850 (2010)
(“Although client data has undergone a radical transformation . . . attorneys have generally continued
to manually review client electronic data . . . in the same manner as they have reviewed paper
documents for generations.”). Naturally, economic incentives drive entrepreneurs to develop costsaving technology to reduce the costs of e-discovery and garner the saved surplus.
92. On the difference between durable and non-durable precautions, see Mark F. Grady, Why
Are People Negligent? Technology, Nondurable Precautions, and the Medical Malpractice Explosion, 82
NW. U. L. REV. 293, 302 (1988).
93. See id. at 310–11 (suggesting repetitiveness is a distinctive feature in determining nondurability and offering the following as examples of non-durable precautions: failure to look for cars,
failure to signal when switching lanes, and an obstetrician’s use of a fetal distress test on a patient).
94. See id. at 310 (explaining a durable precaution is one that lasts for a long period of time and
does not need to be done on a repeated basis, like installing a fire escape).
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Some clients, more than others, have an incentive to invest in durable
or cost-reducing techniques to protect the confidentiality of their
privileged communications. These particular clients are most likely
corporate clients who tend to be sophisticated repeat players in litigation,
clients who seek legal advice with high frequency, and clients who
communicate large volumes of information to their lawyers. Corporate
clients are exposed to the risks of inadvertent waiver more than other
clients.95 Indeed, privilege and inadvertent waiver literature often
overlooks the implications of the differences between different types of
clients.96 Another often-espoused assertion is that corporations do not
need the privilege as an incentive to seek legal advice because, as legal
entities, they have no choice except to operate through lawyers.97 This
assertion should be rejected. The Upjohn rationale does not focus merely
on incentives to seek legal advice, but rather on the ability of clients to
exchange complete and candid information for seeking legal advice. While
corporations are often required to use lawyers to conduct their affairs, they
do not have to be fully candid and sincere with their lawyers while doing
so.
In reality, both individual and corporate clients end up receiving the
optimal legal advice, but at different costs. This eventually influences the
demand for legal advice. For example, individual one-shot clients either
do not approach lawyers for advice because they foresee insufficient
benefits, or as shown in Graph 1, they receive optimal advice providing
them with less-than-maximal benefit because they do not know in advance
what is the most cost-efficient point at which they should stop
communicating additional information to their lawyer.
Another
possibility is, with regard to individual non-expert clients, the lawyer
influences the exact amount of information supplied by the client. If
lawyers compete for the quality of their advice, they are likely to ask the
client to supply the optimal amount of information in order to provide the
optimal amount of advice. A more likely possibility is that competition
among lawyers focuses on producing the largest possible surplus for their
clients; therefore, lawyers would rather stop the client’s stream of
information at the socially suboptimal point, which is privately optimal for

95. JOHN WILLIAM GERGACZ, ATTORNEY–CORPORATE CLIENT PRIVILEGE 5–32 (1987).
96. See DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE: AN ETHICAL STUDY 182 (1988) (observing
that right-based supporters of the privilege often have the individual client in mind, whereas
utilitarian critique of the privilege is usually concerned with corporate actors).
97. Id. at 218.
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the client (coincidentally requiring the lawyer to invest less work because
there is less information to digest).
On the opposite side of the client spectrum, corporate clients are
sensitive to profit-maximizing decisions.98 Therefore, lawyers should keep
these clients sufficiently informed in order to give them the ability to stop
communicating information to the lawyer at their private profitmaximizing point—even though the legal advice received would then be
socially suboptimal. Nevertheless, it is hard to imagine the CEO of a large
corporation explaining to its board of directors that he did not obtain the
best possible legal advice because it was too costly to send more documents
to the firm’s lawyers. Instead, a cost-reducing mechanism would need to
be adopted by using technological developments. Hence, corporate clients
would be able to shift the cost function downwards or, preferably, flatten
the cost function by adopting durable precautions to fit their economies of
scale—thereby securing optimal legal advice.
The above-mentioned conclusions are subject to one caveat: the
assumption that legal advice promotes legal compliance, as suggested in the
Upjohn ruling, is disputed.99 Indeed, if privileged legal advice increases
the probability of the client choosing illegal or socially undesirable actions,
then the policy conclusions should be reversed.
B. The Inadvertent Waiver Doctrine As Applied to Lawyers
This part extends the analysis of the inadvertent waiver doctrine to the
attorney’s actions. Although it is generally accepted that the attorney–
client privilege belongs to the client, the attorney is ordinarily the person
who asserts the privilege on behalf of the client in the course of
litigation.100 The attorney is required to object to the disclosure of
privileged information whether it occurs at trial, at a deposition, in a
request for documents, or in response to interrogatories.101
98. Robert P. Cummins & Megyn M. Kelly, The Conflicting Role of Lawyer As Director,
LITIGATION, Fall 1996, at 48, 48.
99. See, e.g., Steven Shavell, Legal Advice About Contemplated Acts: The Decision to Obtain
Advice, Its Social Desirability, and Protection of Confidentiality, 17 J. LEGAL STUD. 123, 134 (1988)
(suggesting clients will follow legal advice from their attorneys if “expected sanctions equal the harm
that results from sanctionable acts” but if the “expected sanctions are less than the harm caused by the
acts,” clients may not be inclined to follow legal advice).
100. EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, THE NEW WIGMORE: A TREATISE ON EVIDENCE,
EVIDENTIARY PRIVILEGES § 6.5.1, at 535 (Richmond D. Friedman ed., 2002).
101. Rule 34(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure directs requests to produce
documents to the parties themselves and not to their lawyers. FED. R. CIV. P. 34(b)(2). Similarly,
other rules governing the production of evidence and response to interrogatories are also directed at
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Many courts attribute inadvertent disclosure of privileged information
by the lawyer to her client.102 This means the lawyer’s accidental
disclosure of a client’s confidential communication may result in waiver of
the attorney–client privilege.103 As with inadvertent waiver by clients, the
lawyer’s inadvertent disclosure may occur outside the scope of litigation. A
typical example is of the lawyer who accidentally emails his comments on a
draft contract to the other party—thereby exposing the client’s legal
weaknesses to future potential litigants.104 The ABA Ethics 20/20
Commission stated confidentiality may also be lost if unauthorized third
parties access client information or if legal or non-legal employees of the
lawyer reveal the information or transmit it to third parties without
authorization.105 Thus, the legal profession’s main concern to date is
inadvertent waiver during the pretrial discovery process.106

the client and not the lawyer. Id. R. 33. However, the lawyer usually responds to the requests on
behalf of the client. See Steven S. Gensler, Some Thoughts on the Lawyer’s E-volving Duties in
Discovery, 36 N. KY. L. REV. 521, 557 (2009) (stating that, in the American legal system, the parties
are responsible for responding to discovery, but in practice, the lawyer typically dominates the
process).
102. E.g., Sitterson v. Evergreen Sch. Dist. No. 114, 196 P.3d 735, 739 (Wash. Ct. App.
2008) (noting the privilege belongs to the client but waiver by the attorney can be attributed to the
client).
103. This is often concluded from the agency relationship between the client and the lawyer.
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 26 cmt. b (2000) (“Attributing
the acts of lawyers to their clients is warranted by the fact that, in an important sense, they really are
acts authorized by the principal.”); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 14N cmt. a (1958)
(viewing lawyers as agents); see also Deborah A. DeMott, The Lawyer As Agent, 67 FORDHAM L. REV.
301, 301 (1998) (“[T]he lawyer–client relationship is a commonsensical illustration of agency.”).
104. See, e.g., Robertson v. Yamaha Motor Corp. 143 F.R.D. 194, 195–96 (S.D. Ill. 1992)
(recounting facts where, due to a clerical error, an attorney attached privileged documents to a letter
sent to opposing counsel); see also Paula Schaefer, The Future of Inadvertent Disclosure: The Lingering
Need to Revise Professional Conduct Rules, 69 MD. L. REV. 195, 201–02 (2010) (stating inadvertent
waiver is a risk for transactional lawyers outside litigation because “transactional attorneys provide
large volumes of client documents and electronically stored information to other attorneys in nondiscovery contexts, such as when completing due diligence for a business transaction”). But see
Sampson Fire Sales, Inc. v. Oaks, 201 F.R.D. 351, 362–63 (M.D. Pa. 2001) (holding the attorney
did not waive the privilege by accidentally faxing documents to a wrong number because the attorney
took reasonable precautions to prevent inadvertent disclosure, only one disclosure of a single page
occurred, the attorney acted promptly to rectify the disclosure, and the overriding interests of justice
were against waiver).
105. ABA COMMISSION ON ETHICS 20/20, REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES
RESOLUTION 105A, at 4 (Aug. 2012), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/
dam/aba/administrative/ethics_2020/2012_hod_annual_meeting_105a_filed_may_2012.authcheckd
am.pdf.
106. See, e.g., Donald Wochna, Electronic Data, Electronic Searching, Inadvertent Production of
Privileged Data: A Perfect Storm, 43 AKRON L. REV. 847, 850 (2010) (relaying that reviewing
documents for privilege occurs mostly during the general discovery process).
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Courts apply the same liability regimes that apply to the client when
they deal with a lawyer’s inadvertent waiver. In extending the inadvertent
waiver doctrine to the lawyer, a judge will determine whether harm
occurred by applying one of three regimes: strict liability, no liability, or
negligence.107 Under strict liability, any inadvertent disclosure by the
lawyer will result in the loss of the privilege.108 Negligence is the most
commonly used regime with respect to inadvertent waiver by lawyers,109
with the “middle of the road” or balanced five-factors test used as the most
common case-law developed standard of care in determining whether
inadvertent disclosure led to a waiver of privilege.110 The applicable
107. See James M. Grippando, Attorney–Client Privilege: Implied Waiver Through Inadvertent
Disclosure of Documents, 39 U. MIAMI L. REV. 511, 512, 514–15 (1985) (comparing the strict
liability standard with the “conduct analysis” standard, where an attorney’s inadvertent disclosure
does not waive the privilege unless a full or partial disclosure was not accidental).
108. See, e.g., Advanced Med., Inc. v. Arden Med. Sys., Inc., No. 87-3059, 1988 WL 76128,
at *2 (E.D. Pa. July 18, 1988) (“Generally, inadvertent production of documents pursuant to Rule
34 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure, waives any privilege.”); Thomas v. Pansy Ellen Prods., Inc., 672
F. Supp. 237, 242–43 (W.D.N.C. 1987) (deciding voluntary production of documents that were
protected by attorney–client privilege, even though inadvertent, effected waiver of privilege).
109. See, e.g., Heriot v. Byrne, 257 F.R.D. 645, 668–69 (N.D. Ill. 2009) (holding in favor of
retention of the privilege in spite of a significant disclosure of privileged documents where reasonable
procedures were used to review documents in the discovery process), subsequent determination on other
grounds, 2009 WL 982490 (N.D. Ill. 2009); U.S. Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Liberty Surplus Ins. Corp.,
630 F. Supp. 2d 1332, 1341 (M.D. Fla. 2007) (deciding a law firm waived the privilege by failing to
take reasonable precautions to prevent inadvertent disclosure); Atronic Int’l GMBH v. SAI
Semispecialists of Am., Inc., 232 F.R.D. 160, 164 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) (pronouncing that revealing emails between plaintiff’s employee and its counsel constituted waiver of attorney–client privilege on
carelessness grounds); Int’l Bus. Machs. Corp. v. United States, 37 Fed. Cl. 599, 605 (1997)
(adjudging that after four privileged documents were inadvertently disclosed during expedited
discovery in a federal tax proceeding, the lawyers must prove they took adequate precautions to avoid
this kind of disclosure for the privilege to remain intact). Examples of negligence in the discovery
process vary. See, e.g., Banks v. Office of Senate Sergeant-at-Arms, 233 F.R.D. 1, 9 (D.D.C. 2005)
(ruling failure to assert the privilege until after the privilege log was submitted resulted in waiver);
Smithkline Beecham Corp. v. Apotex Corp., 232 F.R.D. 467, 476 (E.D. Pa. 2005) (ruling failure to
identify the author on a privilege log constitutes inadvertent waiver); Cunningham v. Conn. Mut.
Life Ins., 845 F. Supp. 1403, 1408–09 (S.D. Cal. 1994) (deciding failure to place the document on a
privilege log constitutes inadvertent waiver); see also Grace M. Giesel, Client Responsibility for Lawyer
Conduct: Examining the Agency Nature of the Lawyer-Client Relationship, 86 NEB. L. REV. 346, 386–
87 (2007) (“In these inadvertent disclosure settings, the attorney discloses the privileged document as
the result of all sorts of activities, most of which could be classified as varying degrees of negligence.”).
110. See, e.g., Ergo Licensing, LLC v. Carefusion 303, Inc., 263 F.R.D. 40, 47 (D. Me. 2009)
(“On balance, the only reasonable conclusion is that the privilege has not been waived in this case.”);
Bensel v. Air Line Pilots Ass’n, 248 F.R.D. 177, 180–81 (D.N.J. 2008) (applying each of the five
factors for determining whether waiver has occurred and finding four of the five factors in the present
case weighed in favor of finding waiver); United States v. Rigas, 281 F. Supp. 2d 733, 738, 740
(S.D.N.Y. 2003) (holding inadvertent disclosure of work product documents during discovery does
not amount to a waiver where the government took steps to protect such files by maintaining them
on a secure, password-protected computer network); Amgen, Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc.,
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standard of care is often uncertain and vague.111 Only a few courts adopt
a no liability regime for inadvertent disclosure by lawyers.112 Ultimately,
190 F.R.D. 287, 292 (D. Mass. 2000) (applying the “middle test” and finding a waiver of the
privilege when disclosure of 3,821 privileged documents could have been prevented with adequate
precaution); Wallace v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 179 F.R.D. 313, 314 (D. Kan. 1998) (“While,
apparently the initial review was not properly done by reviewing each document . . . the combined
procedures employed to prevent disclosures appears adequate. This factor weighs in favor of finding
that the privilege was not waived.”); see also United Investors Life Ins. Co. v. Nationwide Life Ins.
Co., 233 F.R.D. 483, 491 (N.D. Miss. 2006) (“The court thus finds that the defendants have not by
inadvertent waiver waived their right to any attorney–client privilege or work product protection.”).
111. See, e.g., VLT, Inc. v. Lucent Techs., Inc., 54 Fed. R. Serv. 3d 1319, 1321–22 (D. Mass.
2003) (noting jurisdictions vary with respect to the level of negligence or recklessness that constitutes
inadvertent waiver); Corey v. Norman, Hanson & Detroy, 742 A.2d 933, 942 (Me. 1999) (stating
the balancing approach creates “an uncertain, unpredictable privilege, dependent on the proof of too
many factors concerning the adequacy of the steps taken to prevent disclosure”). It is worth noting in
cases concerning inadvertent waiver in the discovery process, the ratio between the amount of
disclosed documents and the amount of documents reviewed or produced is often one of the
measures used by the court in order to ascertain whether the attorney took reasonable precautions to
avoid inadvertent waiver and meet the court’s standard of care. The ratios vary significantly, thereby
increasing the uncertainty surrounding inadvertent waiver. See, e.g., Edelen v. Campbell Soup Co.,
265 F.R.D. 676, 698 (N.D. Ga. 2010) (holding no waiver where only four pages out of more than a
two-thousand page production were privileged); Heriot, 257 F.R.D. at 659, 662 (judging disclosure
of 13% of privileged documents was significant, but did not waive the privilege as reasonable
procedures had been used to review documents); Laethem Equip. Co. v. Deere & Co., 261 F.R.D.
127, 135 (E.D. Mich. 2009) (ruling disclosure during discovery of two compact discs containing
privileged information was inadvertent and did not constitute a “blanket waiver” of the privilege);
Victor Stanley, Inc. v. Creative Pipe, Inc., 250 F.R.D. 251, 257 (D. Md. 2008) (deciding the
privilege was waived because disclosure of 165 documents from electronically stored data was
substantive, indicating the keyword search performed on the data was not reasonable); Sampson Fire
Sales, Inc. v. Oaks, 201 F.R.D. 351, 362–63 (M.D. Pa. 2001) (deciding an attorney sending a single
page fax to the wrong number did not waive the privilege); Bank Brussels Lambert v. Credit Lyonnais
(Suisse) S.A., 160 F.R.D. 437, 446 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (stating inadvertent disclosure of four privileged
documents did not waive the privilege, because the number of documents erroneously disclosed was
miniscule in relation to the number produced); JWP Zack, Inc. v. Hoosier Energy Rural Elec. Coop.,
Inc., 709 N.E.2d 336, 342–43 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999) (finding no waiver when approximately sixtynine of the over 3,000 pages produced in discovery were privileged).
112. See, e.g., Harold Sampson Children’s Trust v. Linda Gale Sampson 1979 Trust, 679
N.W.2d 794, 802 (Wis. 2004) (holding that imputing the lawyer’s behaviour to the client would not
promote the “functioning of the justice system”); see also KL Group v. Case, Kay & Lynch, 829 F.2d
909, 917–18 (9th Cir. 1987) (declining to regard inadvertent disclosure during discovery as waiver
since the client is the holder of the privilege); Brigham & Women’s Hosp. Inc. v. Teva Pharm. USA,
Inc., 707 F. Supp. 2d 463, 471 (D. Del. 2010) (“Plaintiffs are attempting to use the advice of counsel
both as a sword . . . and as a shield . . . . They cannot have it both ways.”); Premiere Digital Access,
Inc. v. Cent. Tel. Co., 360 F. Supp. 2d 1168, 1174–75 (D. Nev. 2005) (holding only the client can
waive the privilege); Geo. Manor, Inc. v. Ethan Allen, Inc., 753 F. Supp. 936, 936 (S.D. Fla. 1991)
(reasoning an attorney’s inadvertent disclosure does not constitute waiver of the privilege); Helman v.
Murry’s Steaks, Inc., 728 F. Supp. 1099, 1104 (D. Del. 1990) (“It would fly in the face of the
attorney–client privilege to allow a truly inadvertent disclosure of a privileged communication by
counsel to waive the client’s privilege.”); Mendenhall v. Barber-Greene Co., 531 F. Supp. 951, 955
(N.D. Ill. 1982) (“[I]f we are serious about the attorney–client privilege and its relation to the client’s
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the rules of harm are the same regardless of whether the inadvertent waiver
was caused by the client or the lawyer because the direct bearer of the harm
is always the client.
Should courts hold the inadvertent waiver by the lawyer against the
client? For the most part, courts have answered this question in the
affirmative. The prevailing justification is that the lawyer is the client’s
agent in asserting the privilege and therefore should be perceived as an
agent of the client with regard to inadvertent disclosure of privileged
material.113 This approach is based on an extension of the agency
relationship between the agent, the lawyer, and his principal, the client.114
Some courts find the lawyer’s behavior should be attributed to the client
because of the client’s ability to choose the lawyer who represents her115—
thereby holding the client responsible for the consequences of choosing a
careless lawyer. Other courts simply apply an expanded agency doctrine,
attributing the lawyer’s inadvertent behavior to the client.116
My intention in this part of the discussion is to challenge the logic of
the aforementioned extension by pointing out its incompatibility with the
objectives of the privilege. As I will demonstrate, the lawyer’s inadvertent
welfare, we should require more than such negligence by counsel before the client can be deemed to
have given up the privilege.”); Grace M. Giesel, Client Responsibility for Lawyer Conduct: Examining
the Agency Nature of the Lawyer-Client Relationship, 86 NEB. L. REV. 346, 391 (2007) (noting many
no-waiver rulings are linked to Mendenhall’s holding that waiver required “intentional
relinquishment or abandonment of a known right,” but asserting this is an erroneous interpretation
of agency law because the waiver need not necessarily be intentional and knowing as long as it was
voluntary); Alan J. Meese, Inadvertent Waiver of the Attorney-Client Privilege by Disclosure of
Documents: An Economic Analysis, 23 CREIGHTON L. REV. 513, 528, 536 (1990) (identifying
Mendenhall with the subjective intent responsibility regime in tort law but eventually noting that
“most courts do not use subjective intent approach”)
113. See, e.g., Grace M. Giesel, Client Responsibility for Lawyer Conduct: Examining the Agency
Nature of the Lawyer-Client Relationship, 86 NEB. L. REV. 346, 381 (2007) (acknowledging it is a
widely accepted practice for attorneys acting as agents of their clients to have authority to assert the
privilege).
114. See id. at 350–51 (noting also that the extension can be controversial).
115. See Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 633–34 (1962) (dismissing the petitioner’s
claim due to the unexcused conduct of his counsel and adding that the “[p]etitioner voluntarily chose
this attorney as his representative in the action, and he cannot now avoid the consequences of the acts
or omissions of this freely selected agent”).
116. See Grace M. Giesel, Client Responsibility for Lawyer Conduct: Examining the Agency
Nature of the Lawyer-Client Relationship, 86 NEB. L. REV. 346, 348 (2007) (“These courts do not
treat the [attorney–client] relationship as they do other [agent–principal] relationships. . . . [S]ome
courts seem to apply a modified agency doctrine to the question of whether an attorney has waived
the attorney–client privilege.”); Audrey Rogers, New Insights on Waiver and the Inadvertent Disclosure
of Privileged Materials: Attorney Responsibility As the Governing Precept, 47 FLA. L. REV. 159, 165 n.20
(1995) (observing the expanded application of the agency doctrine “is rarely explicit—most cases do
not lay out the analytical groundwork of expressing that the attorney is the client’s agent”).
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waiver is an unreliable and inefficient proxy for the client’s concern for
confidentiality.
1. The Moral Hazard Problem
For the lawyer’s inadvertent waiver to serve as the court’s litmus test of
the client’s valuation of confidentiality, one must assume a lawyer’s
carelessness implies that his client is at least indifferent to the loss of
confidentiality with respect to the same privileged communications.117
This requires an underlying assumption—that the client can both monitor
the lawyer’s level of care and influence it.118
The striking fact about inadvertent waiver by the lawyer is that its
harm is borne by the client.119 Hence, the lawyer does not directly
internalize the harm caused by this negligent behavior and therefore does
not have direct incentives to take precautions against it.120 Despite the
apparent moral hazard problem, when courts impute the lawyer’s behavior
to the client they do so on the premise of a perfect alignment of interests
between lawyers and their clients.121 Several obstacles create a divergence
between the lawyer’s investment in care and the client’s intentions and
incentives, which turns inadvertent disclosure of privileged material by the
lawyer into an inaccurate signal.

117. See Audrey Rogers, New Insights on Waiver and the Inadvertent Disclosure of Privileged
Materials: Attorney Responsibility As the Governing Precept, 47 FLA. L. REV. 159, 167 (1995) (noting
one rationale is “that the client has the ability to protect the confidentiality of privileged materials
and that, therefore, any disclosure is a manifestation of the client’s lack of intent to keep the
confidential status of the materials”).
118. See Grace M. Giesel, Client Responsibility for Lawyer Conduct: Examining the Agency
Nature of the Lawyer-Client Relationship, 86 NEB. L. REV. 346, 349 (2007) (asserting clients in the
current era are sophisticated and “should be held accountable for their agent’s actions”).
119. See Audrey Rogers, New Insights on Waiver and the Inadvertent Disclosure of Privileged
Materials: Attorney Responsibility As the Governing Precept, 47 FLA. L. REV. 159, 189 (1995)
(“[A]lthough the negligence is the attorney’s, the penalty harms the client, whose confidential
materials were exposed and used against him. The client pays the price for his attorney’s
negligence.”).
120. See id. at 190 (“A blanket rule does not discriminate between different degrees of care an
attorney might take to avoid disclosure and therefore does not reward professional excellence.”).
121. See Grace M. Giesel, Client Responsibility for Lawyer Conduct: Examining the Agency
Nature of the Lawyer-Client Relationship, 86 NEB. L. REV. 346, 385 (2007) (“Most courts seem to
accept that an attorney is acting with implied authority, or at least apparent authority, to waive the
privilege when the attorney fails to object to a disclosure, knowingly discloses a communication
known to be privileged . . . .”); Bradley G. Johnson, Note, Ready or Not, Here They Come: Why the
ABA Should Amend the Model Rules to Accommodate Multidisciplinary Practices, 57 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 951, 982–83 (2000) (giving examples of how an attorney’s interests may differ from his client’s
interests).
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Attributing the lawyer’s inadvertent waiver to the client is only
justified if the existing ethical or legal mechanisms create a reasonably
accurate alignment of the lawyer’s level of care with his specific client’s
expectations. If there are reasons to believe the lawyer’s behavior might
not fairly reflect the client’s interest in confidentiality, it would be
inefficient and potentially counterproductive to draw conclusions about
the client’s interest from the lawyer’s inadvertent waiver. The existing legal
and ethical mechanisms designed to ensure the lawyer’s obligation to
confidentiality are insufficient to solve the agency problem.
2. The Ethical Duty
Lawyers have an incentive to commit to a certain level of care because
confidentiality is intrinsically important to the client in litigation and, even
if it is not used in litigation, because privileged material can be useful to
opposing counsel when strategizing for the case.122 If lawyers do not
commit to a certain level of care, the additional expected harm borne by
the client as a result of the lawyer’s lack of care will reduce the willingness
of clients to consult with lawyers. It is therefore in lawyers’ best interests
to have an explicit duty to maintain confidentiality in their ethical canons.
This duty of confidentiality exists in Rule 1.6(a) of the ABA Model Rules
of Professional Conduct (Model Rules).123 However, until recently, the
ensuing obligation to avoid inadvertent waiver was less explicit and could
only be understood by reading the commentary to Model Rule 1.6.124
The accidental disclosure of confidential information can nonetheless
be viewed as a breach of the lawyer’s ethical obligation. Following the
recommendation of the ABA Ethics 20/20 Commission, Rule 1.6 of the
Model Rules was recently amended to include an explicit obligation,
stating: “A lawyer shall make reasonable efforts to prevent the inadvertent
or unauthorized disclosure of, or unauthorized access to, information
relating to the representation of a client.”125
122. See Jessica Wang, Note, Nonwaiver Agreements After Federal Rule of Evidence 502: A
Glance at Quick-Peek and Clawback Agreements, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1835, 1846 (2009) (noting
opposing counsel can use privileged material to strategize for their case even if they are not able to use
the evidence in court).
123. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(a) (2012) (providing the statutory
scheme for confidentiality of information).
124. See id. cmt. 16–17 (explaining the attorney’s duty to act competently to preserve
confidentiality and take reasonable precautions when transmitting communications).
125. ABA COMMISSION ON ETHICS 20/20, REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES
RESOLUTION 105A, at 4 (Aug. 2012), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/
aba/administrative/ethics_2020/2012_hod_annual_meeting_105a_filed_may_2012.authcheckdam.p
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What really matters is whether the ethical quasi-contractual obligation
transforms into an actual standard of care that reflects the client’s interest
in confidentiality. For this to occur, two conditions must be met. First,
lawyers must develop practical standards that reflect the care desired by
their clients. Second, ethical tribunals or courts must enforce these
standards efficiently.
The first condition is unlikely to be met because lawyers often do not
ask their clients how much they care about confidentiality. After all, the
purpose of the ethical obligation of confidentiality is to act as a default rule
and to save the lawyer and the client the need to exchange information,
negotiate, and contract about confidentiality.126
Hence, the lawyer’s ethical duty of confidentiality does not create an
incentive for the lawyer to align his investment in care with the client’s
desired level of confidentiality. This is because the lawyer’s ethical
obligation will only matter if an ethics tribunal or a court finds the lawyer
failed to take reasonable precautions against inadvertent disclosure.127
The ethics tribunal’s standard of care matters to the lawyer more than the
client’s expectations, but ethics tribunals do not necessarily have the
client’s best interest in mind, nor do they have an incentive to seek and
ascertain the level of care for confidentiality desired by the client.
Therefore, the tribunal’s standard is likely to be vague at best and below
average.128
df.
126. See id. at 5 (“A client may require the lawyer to implement special security measures not
required by this Rule or give informed consent to forgo security measures that would otherwise be
required by this Rule.”).
127. See Paula Schaefer, The Future of Inadvertent Disclosure: The Lingering Need to Revise
Professional Conduct Rules, 86 MD. L. REV. 195, 202 (2010) (“If the consequences of the disclosure
are sufficiently severe, the client may file an ethics complaint or sue the attorney for professional
negligence.”).
128. Section 52(1) of the Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers defines the
standard of care as “the competence and diligence normally exercised by lawyers in similar
circumstances,” but the commentary to section 52 clarifies the lawyer’s duty of care “does not require
‘average’ performance.” RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 52 & cmt.
b (1998); see also Jessica Wang, Note, Nonwaiver Agreements After Federal Rule of Evidence 502: A
Glance at Quick-Peek and Clawback Agreements, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1835, 1853 (2009)
(acknowledging “the duty-of-care standard is fairly liberal”). The ABA Ethics 20/20 Technology and
Confidentiality Report proposed a fairly vague reasonableness standard. ABA COMMISSION ON
ETHICS 20/20, REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES RESOLUTION 105A, at 5 (Aug. 2012),
available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/ethics_2020/2012_hod_
annual_meeting_105a_filed_may_2012.authcheckdam.pdf. The Commission proposed amending
Comment 17 of Model Rule 1.6 to include some factors that may be considered in determining
whether the lawyer used reasonable care, including, but not limited to:
[T]he sensitivity of the information, the likelihood of disclosure if additional safeguards are not
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Furthermore, ethical sanctions imposed on the lawyer do not directly
benefit the client, which means the sanctions are unlikely to correspond
with the client’s specific expectations.129 Instead, they will reflect a
general professional norm.130 Therefore, sanctions imposed on lawyers
who breach their ethical obligation of confidentiality produce a standard
level of care, but they do not require the lawyer to learn the client’s exact
desired level of care.131
The tough harm rule poses another complication. The scope of the
ethical duty of confidentiality is wider than the scope of the privilege;
therefore, it may include information not covered by the privilege.132
Should the accidental disclosure of confidential—but otherwise
unprivileged—information by the lawyer be attributed to the client and
employed, the cost of employing additional safeguards, the difficulty of implementing the
safeguards, and the extent to which the safeguards adversely affect the lawyer’s ability to
represent clients (e.g., by making a device or important piece of software excessively difficult to
use).
Id. These factors are not identical to the five-factor test or to other inadvertent waiver standards used
by courts, and thus they may increase confusion. The proposed amendment to Comment 17 in fact
further relaxes the standard by downplaying it with respect to communications made at the stage of
establishing the legal representation. Id.
129. RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 243 (8th ed. 2011) (arguing
incentives are suboptimal when damages are not paid to the victims).
130. See David B. Wilkins, Who Should Regulate Lawyers?, 105 HARV. L. REV. 799, 806 (1999)
(observing the aim of professional ethics disciplinary actions is deterrence, not compensation).
131. In addition, if ethical sanctions were the only mechanism to assure against loss of
confidentiality, this would create a standard professional level of care across the profession with a
twofold effect. On one hand, clients that desire a sub-standard level of care would refrain from
seeking legal advice in some cases because the cost of care that is embodied in the price of legal advice
will be too high. On the other hand, clients for whom the standard level of care is insufficient,
because they desire a higher level of confidentiality, would also avoid legal advice because of the
potential harm they will bear if inadvertent waiver occurs—unless they could demand specific higher
care before seeking legal advice. The recent Ethics 20/20 Commission took a step in the right
direction by proposing that contracting between the client and the lawyer on the level of care is
allowed. See ABA COMMISSION ON ETHICS 20/20, REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES
RESOLUTION 105A, at 5 (Aug. 2012), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/
dam/aba/administrative/ethics_2020/2012_hod_annual_meeting_105a_filed_may_2012.authcheckd
am.pdf (allowing a client to require more or fewer security measures than required by Rule 1.6(c)).
There are other methods to motivate lawyers, such as contingency-based fees, which tie the lawyer’s
payoff to the successful outcome of the case, thereby inducing the lawyer to take precautions to avoid
waiver of evidence that will decrease the probability of success. This aspect will not be discussed here
because it has only partial relevance to our analysis. It applies only when the lawyer causes the waiver
while representing the client in litigation. However, a lawyer might cause inadvertent waiver while
rendering ex-ante legal advice independent of the litigation. He might not represent the client in the
pursuant litigation, and thus the ability to weave the litigation outcome into the fee scheme is not
always available.
132. See DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE: AN ETHICAL STUDY 201 (1988) (“The duty
of confidentiality is broader than the privilege in two respects.”).
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imply, due to the tough harm rule, that the client did not care about the
confidentiality of confidential and privileged information as well? This
seems to be an inordinately broad construction of the signaling effect of
inadvertent waiver.
In fact, calibrating the lawyer’s level of care with the client’s exact
expectations is likely to be an impossible task. First, the assumption that
clients know exactly how much they value confidentiality before
communicating information with the lawyer is dubious. Often, the client
learns the value of confidentiality only after communicating with the
lawyer. Even if a client knows she is interested in confidentiality, she
might not be able to fully convey the desired level of care to her lawyer,
and the lawyer might not be able to translate the client’s desire to maintain
confidentiality into the correct investment in care. With the increasing
amount of information that clients communicate to their lawyers and the
overwhelming complexity of pretrial discovery, it seems that the client’s
knowledge about the exact level of care lawyers can employ is diminishing.
For example, pretrial e-discovery is an expert’s field, increasingly
outsourced by lawyers to non-lawyers with relevant computer and datasearch expertise.133 Lawyers normally do not possess cutting edge
knowledge in this field, which means their ability to translate the client’s
desired level of care into actual precautionary measures is especially
limited. The difficulty is manifested by the ABA Ethics 20/20
Commission’s admission that technology is changing too rapidly for it to
provide an accurate set of precautions.134
3. Malpractice Lawsuits
The perfect solution to the moral hazard problem is to enhance the
private incentives to sue. The client’s primary private tool in policing his
agent’s level of care is an ex-post remedy: the malpractice lawsuit.135 The
133. See generally Donald Wochna, Electronic Data, Electronic Searching, Inadvertent Production
of Privileged Data: A Perfect Storm, 43 AKRON L. REV. 847, 854–55 (2010) (expounding on the
expertise required for the electronic pre-production privilege).
134. See ABA COMMISSION ON ETHICS 20/20, REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES
RESOLUTION 105A, at 5 (Aug. 2012), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/
dam/aba/administrative/ethics_2020/2012_hod_annual_meeting_105a_filed_may_2012.authcheckd
am.pdf (proposing the establishment of a website that will provide updated information about the
current technological standards of care).
135. Section 60(b) of the Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers states: “[T]he
lawyer must take steps reasonable in the circumstances to protect confidential client information
against impermissible use or disclosure.” RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING
LAWYERS § 60(b) (2000). Furthermore, section 86(1)(b) requires the lawyer to invoke the privilege
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lawyer’s liability for professional malpractice will naturally be governed by
a negligence regime. The client will have to prove the lawyer failed to take
the required precautions to avoid accidental disclosure of confidences.136
If the client succeeds, the lawyer must compensate the client for the
damage, and thus internalize what should have been the level of care—or
at least the court’s interpretation of the client’s desired level of care.137
However, many argue this ex-post mechanism fails to provide a perfect
solution to the moral hazard problem.138
The first argument duplicates the prior argument regarding the failure
of the ethical duty. Courts determine the lawyer’s malpractice liability
according to a general professional standard of care and not according to
the client’s specific expectations.139 Judges do not ascertain the client’s
“when doing so appears reasonably appropriate, unless the client has waived the privilege or has
authorized the lawyer or agent to waive it.” Id. § 86(1)(b); see Grace M. Giesel, Client Responsibility
for Lawyer Conduct: Examining the Agency Nature of the Lawyer-Client Relationship, 86 NEB. L. REV.
346, 383 (2007) (noting a lawyer’s failure to assert the privilege on behalf of the client would most
likely be viewed as professional malpractice).
136. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(c) (2012) (establishing a lawyer has a
duty to “make reasonable efforts to prevent the inadvertent or unauthorized disclosure of . . .
information relating to the representation of a client”); Jeanne Andrea Di Grazio, Note, The Calculus
of Confidentiality: Ethical and Legal Approaches to the Labyrinth of Corporate Attorney–Client
Communications Via E-mail and the Internet—From Upjohn Co. v. United States and Its Progeny to
the Hand Calculus Revisited and Revised, 23 DEL. J. CORP. L. 553, 553 (1998) (“The Model Codes of
Professional Responsibility and the Model Rules of Professional Conduct set forth certain guidelines
for lawyers regarding their obligations to their clients and the safeguards they should undertake to
secure confidential client communications.”).
137. See Christopher M.E. Painter, Note, Tort Creditor Priority in the Secured Credit System:
Asbestos Times, the Worst of Times, 36 STAN. L. REV. 1045, 1078 n.142 (1984) (“The more expected
accident costs a producer internalized, the more his level of care would approach the socially desired
level of care . . . and the more accurately the price of his product would reflect the full social costs of
accidents.”).
138. I do not claim that malpractice lawsuits have no effect whatsoever, but that their effect is
uncertain, inaccurate, and suboptimal. The fact that malpractice lawsuits have an effect on discovery
is apparent from offshore outsourcing of pre-production privilege reviews. Potential malpractice
liability is a factor in the phenomenon of privilege review outsourcing. But see Vincent R. Johnson &
Stephen C. Loomis, Malpractice Liability Related to Foreign Outsourcing of Legal Services, 2 ST.
MARY’S J. LEGAL MAL. & ETHICS 262, 266–67 (2012) (describing the numerous possibilities for
malpractice claims in legal outsourcing). As Professor Robertson notes, however, it is not lawyers
who are the impetus for outsourcing; rather, the phenomenon is led by corporations seeking legal
services. See Cassandra Burke Robertson, A Collaborative Model of Offshore Legal Outsourcing, 43
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 125, 137 (2011) (“Companies’ outside law firms may participate in the process of
offshoring if their clients demand it, but most law firms are unlikely to initiate it without client
participation.”).
139. See Timothy P. Terrell, Professionalism on an International Scale: The Lex Mundi Project to
Identify the Fundamental Shared Values of Law Practice, 23 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 469, 576 (2009)
(discussing how a lawyer’s standard of care is based on “the lawyer’s ‘fiduciary duty’ to a client and is
the usual foundation for discussions of the standard of care and the reasonably prudent lawyer”).

BAUM_FINAL

2013]

6/20/2013 9:28:50 AM

A Law and Economics Perspective on Inadvertent Waiver

155

ex-ante desired level of care when they determine the lawyer’s liability.140
Therefore, this standard of care does not necessarily reflect the care desired
by the average client or by the specific claimant.141
Secondly, even if the standard of care represents the socially efficient
level, malpractice lawsuits against lawyers are notoriously difficult to
win.142 Thus, many clients who suffered harm from the lawyer’s
inadvertent waiver may prefer to avoid malpractice litigation with its
certain costs and uncertain benefits.143 Because of this, the suboptimal
rate of malpractice litigation will result in lawyers employing precautions at
a level lower than what their clients would have desired, unless courts
adjust damages upwards to compensate for the suboptimal rate of
enforcement. The latter also will not fully solve the problem because some
defendants will be judgment-proof due to insufficient personal funds or
limited professional malpractice insurance.
Another problematic discrepancy between the lawyer’s level of care and
the client’s desired level of care arises if the judge uses a strict liability
regime to determine whether a lawyer accidentally disclosed privileged
information, but applies a negligence regime to determine liability in
lawyer malpractice lawsuits.144 In such a setting, as long as the lawyer
140. The five-factor test, for example, does not mention the client’s expectations at all. See Lois
Sportswear, U.S.A., Inc. v. Levi Strauss & Co., 104 F.R.D. 103, 105 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (“The
elements which go into that determination include the reasonableness of the precautions to prevent
inadvertent disclosure, the time taken to rectify the error, the scope of the discovery and the extent of
the disclosure. There is, of course, an overreaching issue of fairness . . . .”).
141. For the same reason, professional liability insurance focuses on the court’s standard of care
and thus fails to produce incentives that capture the client’s interests. RICHARD POSNER,
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 243, 254–59 (8th ed. 2011).
142. See Jessica Wang, Note, Nonwaiver Agreements After Federal Rule of Evidence 502: A
Glance at Quick-Peek and Clawback Agreements, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1835, 1859 (2009) (“Moreover,
[client-initiated] suits may be difficult to prove, the process may take a very long time, and they
would impose additional litigation costs and stress on the court docket.” (citing David B. Wilkins,
Who Should Regulate Lawyers?, 105 HARV. L. REV. 799, 831 (1992))).
143. See id. at 1858–59 (showing malpractice lawsuits are not an efficient policing
mechanism).
144. This may also happen in the ethical context. The ethical duty of care is examined through
the lens of a negligence regime. Therefore, in some cases, confidentiality will be lost without the
lawyer being responsible for professional misconduct and the client will bear the residual harm. The
ABA Ethics 20/20 Technology and Confidentiality Report clarifies, with respect to its proposed Rule
1.6(c), that:
[P]aragraph (c) does not mean that a lawyer engages in professional misconduct any time a
client’s confidences are subject to unauthorized access or disclosed inadvertently or without
authority. A sentence in Comment [16] makes this point explicitly. The reality is that
disclosures can occur even if lawyers take all reasonable precautions.
ABA COMMISSION ON ETHICS 20/20, REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES RESOLUTION
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maintains the court-determined standard of care, she will be able to avoid
liability for malpractice. However, because strict liability is applied to
inadvertent waiver, some residual harm will be borne by the client—and
will never be internalized by the lawyer.145
Finally, because a lawyer is sometimes allowed to reveal a client’s
privileged communications when sued by the client, ethical rules might
discourage clients from suing their lawyers for malpractice.146
Consequently, private policing of the lawyer’s level of care, via a
malpractice lawsuit, is affected by the court’s choice of harm rule. To
understand why this is so, assume that after an inadvertent waiver has
occurred, the client threatens to sue the lawyer. The lawyer retaliates by
threatening to disclose the client’s privileged communications in the
process of defending himself. When the lenient harm rule applies, the
client stands to lose more from suing her lawyer because the negligent
waiver itself does not cause the disclosure of all the privileged
communications, but suing the lawyer may cause that damaging result.147
On the other hand, if the tough harm rule applies, the client has already
lost the privilege with regard to all communicated material on the subject
matter; therefore, she is no longer deterred from suing the lawyer because
she has nothing more to lose in terms of confidentiality.148 It follows that
the tough harm rule brings us closer to perfect alignment of client and

105A, at 5 (Aug. 2012), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/
ethics_2020/2012_hod_annual_meeting_105a_filed_may_2012.authcheckdam.pdf.
145. See Audrey Rogers, New Insights on Waiver and the Inadvertent Disclosure of Privileged
Materials: Attorney Responsibility As the Governing Precept, 47 FLA. L. REV. 159, 190 (1995) (pointing
out an attorney can avoid liability through application of standards that do not take the expected
degree of care into account).
146. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b) (2012) (“A lawyer may reveal
information relating to the representation of a client to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes
necessary . . . to establish a claim or defense on behalf of the lawyer in a controversy between the
lawyer and the client, to establish a defense to a criminal charge or civil claim against the lawyer based
upon conduct in which the client was involved, or to respond to allegations in any proceeding
concerning the lawyer’s representation of the client.”); see also Berliner Corcoran & Rowe, LLP v.
Orian, 662 F. Supp. 2d 130, 135 (D.D.C. 2009) (holding clients “waived the attorney–client
privilege with respect to” communications with their attorneys when they filed counterclaims against
the attorneys).
147. See, e.g., Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Marine Midland Realty Credit Corp., 138 F.R.D.
479, 484 (E.D. Va. 1991) (limiting the extent of the inadvertent waiver to the actual document
disclosed).
148. See, e.g., Navajo Nation v. Peabody Holding Co., Inc., 255 F.R.D. 37, 48 (D.D.C. 2009)
(noting “any disclosure of attorney–client material will be considered ‘a waiver of the privilege as to
all communications relating to the same subject matter’” (quoting In re United Mine Workers of Am.
Emp. Benefit Plans Litig., 159 F.R.D. 307, 312 (D.D.C. 1994))).
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lawyer incentives to take precautions, provided we espouse the policing
effect of malpractice claims.
4. Reputation
Lawyers may be motivated to avoid inadvertent waiver due to the
potential reputational damage.149 Clearly, lawyers care about their
reputation and take measures to develop and safeguard it.150 Reputationpreserving activities probably include measures against inadvertent waiver.
Nonetheless, this begs the question whether reputation concerns are
sufficient to create a reasonably accurate alignment of the lawyer’s
investment in care with the client’s desire for care to justify the signaling
effect attributed to the lawyer’s behavior by the courts.
The effect of reputational damage on a lawyer depends on the lawyer’s
perception of the behavior of future clients. In turn, this perception
depends on whether future clients will learn about the lawyer’s lack of care,
attribute the client’s losses to that behavior, and are themselves concerned
about confidentiality. In the process of choosing his lawyer, the client
weighs a variety of factors—only one of which is the lawyer’s reputation in
handling the client’s confidentiality. However, reputation is likely not the
most pivotal factor in clients’ decision to retain a lawyer.
First of all, there is no easily accessible data ranking lawyers’
inadvertent waivers, or even a methodical collection or assessment of this
information available to non-experts. Even if such data was accessible to
potential clients, they might not seek it because even if confidentiality
matters to clients, inadvertent waiver is not on top of the client’s
reputation concerns.151 Indeed, there are good reasons to believe
technology such as search websites, social networks, and professional
databases change the way clients seek and retain lawyers.152 However, the
literature concerning legal reputation does not deal with inadvertent
waiver, and the scant empirical data indicates clients’ awareness regarding
149. See Karl S. Okamoto, Reputation and the Value of Lawyers, 74 OR. L. REV. 15, 38 (1995)
(“[T]he existence of segmentation in the market for legal services based on the value of reputation.”).
150. See id. at 20–21 (noting reputation is an important concern that “exists and affects law
firm behavior”).
151. See Fred C. Zacharias, Effects of Reputation on the Legal Profession, 65 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 173, 186 (2008) (“Earned reputation may exist but never be available or sought by clients.”).
152. See ABA COMMISSION ON ETHICS 20/20, INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW 5 (Aug.
2012), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/ethics_2020/2012
0508_ethics_20_20_final_hod_introdution_and_overview_report.authcheckdam.pdf (“Technology
is changing the way that clients find lawyers.”).
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confidentiality and privilege is not high.153 While technology may have
altered the way clients seek lawyers, there is no indication that it has
changed their qualitative preferences.
Second, reputational information that is accessible is likely to be
slanted in favor of lawyers. As explained in the preceding part, malpractice
lawsuits and ethical complaints against lawyers are filed at a suboptimal
rate. Lawyers also have an interest in settling malpractice lawsuits out of
court in order to mitigate the reputational effects—thereby tilting the
accuracy of public information in their favor.154
Finally, as with other reputational matters, inadvertent waiver is very
fact-sensitive.155 For example, a client may not know a firm found liable
for malpractice no longer employs the lawyer responsible for the waiver, or
that another firm with no inadvertent waiver history now employs the
liable lawyer. Similarly, a firm’s careless loss of the privilege during ediscovery is not necessarily relevant or indicative of its care for
confidentiality when a potential client is seeking legal advice and not
representation. Hence, reputation cannot guarantee the accuracy of
attributing inadvertent waiver by lawyers to their clients.
5. Obscuring the Client’s Genuine Interest
In the previous sections, I argued that ethical norms, malpractice
lawsuits, and reputation concerns are insufficient to align accurately the
lawyer’s level of care for confidentiality with the level desired by the client.
The probabilities that inadvertent waiver will befall the lawyer or the
client are not dependent upon each other. Thus, when a court is faced
with an inadvertent waiver by a lawyer, the judge no longer examines the
care taken by the client with respect to the same piece of information. If
the lawyer’s precautions do not reflect the client’s desired level of care, and
the court recognizes inadvertent waiver by the lawyer and orders the
disclosure of confidential communications, the court ignores the client’s
153. See DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE: AN ETHICAL STUDY 218 n.26 (1988) (citing
an unpublished empirical survey by Fred Zacharias that found approximately 70% of the subjects
would not withhold information from the lawyer sans confidentiality, and “most people were . . .
unaware of the attorney–client privilege”).
154. See ROBERT H. ARONSON & DONALD T. WECKSTEIN, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
IN A NUTSHELL 90 (2d ed. 1991) (noting attorneys facing a malpractice suit have an incentive to
settle out of court and include confidentiality terms in the settlement).
155. See Fred C. Zacharias, Effects of Reputation on the Legal Profession, 65 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 173, 189 (2008) (“Unless a client is in a position to inquire specifically about prior results, and
knows the questions to ask, result information may be meaningless . . . .”).
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complete and candid interest in confidentiality.156
A client may place a high premium on the confidentiality of Document
A but care less about Document B. He communicates both documents to
the lawyer, but encrypts Document A while sharing Document B through
an online file sharing website without any protection. The lawyer then
negligently discloses Document A in pretrial discovery, and the privilege is
held to be inadvertently lost with respect to this document. Recognizing
the lawyer’s inadvertent waiver means the court will not observe or even
examine the genuine level of confidentiality desired by the client in regards
to Document A.
When the tough harm rule is combined with the recognition of
inadvertent waiver by lawyers, the potential for inaccuracy grows. Recall
that under the tough harm rule, both Documents A and B are deprivileged once confidentiality is lost with respect to one of them. Under
the tough harm rule, the rational client will encrypt and protect both
documents. Now assume the lawyer takes less care to protect Document B
once he realizes this document is less important to the client’s case—and
subsequently negligently discloses this document. Again, courts will
disregard the client’s real investment in confidentiality and an extremely
inaccurate result will follow: lack of care with respect to the least
confidential document will be accepted as a proxy for an inadvertent
waiver of the most confidential document.157 Indeed, this logic justifies
the approach adopted by Federal Rule of Evidence 502(a), limiting the
scope of the waiver to the disclosed document.
III. CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
The attorney–client privilege is a longstanding tenet of procedural law
in common law jurisdictions. In recent decades, it has maintained its
importance under the premise that it encourages clients to seek legal advice

156. Accuracy with regard to the client’s observed interest in confidentiality matters a great
deal. See Navajo Nation v. Peabody Holding Co., Inc., 255 F.R.D. 37, 48 (D.D.C. 2009) (“The
attorney–client privilege demands adherence to ‘genuine confidentiality.’” (quoting Permian Corp. v.
United States, 665 F.2d 1214, 1217 (D.C. Cir. 1981))).
157. See In re United Mine Workers of Am. Emp. Benefit Plans Litig., 159 F.R.D. 307, 310
(D.D.C. 1994) (noting regardless of the level of care for any other communications, “any disclosure
inconsistent with the confidential nature of the attorney–client relationship waives the attorney–
client privilege . . . as to all other communications related to the same subject matter” (citing In re
Sealed Case, 877 F.2d 976, 980 (D.C. Cir. 1989))); see also In re Sealed Case, 877 F.2d at 980
(declaring further the court “will not distinguish between various degrees of ‘voluntariness’ in waivers
of the attorney–client privilege”).
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and promotes a candid attorney–client exchange of information—this
purportedly enhances legal compliance with regard to contemplated
actions.
The privilege has its social costs in withholding possibly relevant
evidence from the courts. The inadvertent waiver doctrine aims to reduce
these costs when observable signals of carelessness indicate the client has
not placed sufficient importance on the confidentiality of the information
exchanged with his lawyer.
While courts have not declared this in so many words, they have
applied the inadvertent waiver doctrine as a form of accident, using various
liability regimes and applying them in order to determine whether to
inflict the resulting harm on the client.
This Article demonstrated that applying a strict liability regime, as a
minority of the courts do, is incompatible with the current rationale of the
privilege to promote compliance through seeking confidential legal advice.
Furthermore, courts should adopt more lenient harm rules—with respect
to the evidence that is disclosed after inadvertent waiver has occurred—if
seeking legal advice is important for clients who share small volumes of
information with their lawyers and therefore lack the incentive to invest in
costly durable precautions. Such clients should be treated differently than
those who share large volumes of information with their lawyers and thus
have an incentive to adopt cost-reducing and durable precaution
technology.
Courts also impute the lawyer’s inadvertent waiver to the client and
employ the same liability regimes and harm rules to the lawyer’s behaviour.
Considering the enormous increase in costs inflicted on litigants in the
pretrial discovery phase because of possible inadvertent waiver by the
lawyer, and given the inaccuracy of such inadvertent waiver as an
indicative or a predictive signal of the client’s care for confidentiality, the
best solution would be to abolish the doctrine that attributes the lawyer’s
inadvertent waiver to the client. Courts would do better to stay focused on
the client.
This might seem an extreme solution, but some courts follow this
path,158 and there is no evidence yet to contradict the claim that the
158. See, e.g., KL Group v. Case, Kay & Lynch, 829 F.2d 909, 919 (9th Cir. 1987) (declining
to regard inadvertent disclosure during discovery as waiver because the client is the holder of the
privilege); Brigham & Women’s Hosp. Inc. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., 707 F. Supp. 2d 463, 469–70
(D. Del. 2010) (“Because the privilege belongs to the client, not the attorney, only the client may
waive it.” (citing In re Seagate Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2007))); Premiere Digital
Access, Inc. v. Cent. Tel. Co., 360 F. Supp. 2d 1168, 1174 (D. Nev. 2005) (stating only the client
can waive the attorney–client privilege); Georgetown Manor, Inc. v. Ethan Allen, Inc., 753 F. Supp.
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abolition of inadvertent waiver compromises the ability of these courts to
adjudicate cases accurately and properly. In addition, given that this
solution saves the court significant time and effort required in order to
adjudicate inadvertent waiver battles, it is consistent with the original
intent of the framers of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRPC) to
leave the court out of the discovery process as much as possible.159
Furthermore, Rule 26 of the FRCP allows the parties to contract out of
inadvertent waiver in pretrial discovery in various ways such as “claw-back”
and “quick peek” agreements,160 thereby implicitly acknowledging the
problematic aspects of inadvertent waiver in this phase of litigation. This
legislation does not entirely solve the problem because parties might object
to such agreements.161 Hence, a better solution would be to completely
abolish the doctrine.
Sceptical courts may prefer a less extreme recommendation. A less
drastic, second-best solution would be to abolish the inadvertent waiver
doctrine for lawyers in all phases of lawyer–client communications except
for the final phase—litigation in court. Presumably, when lawyers and
clients appear in court, they are at the peak of their alertness and
coordination with respect to the case. Therefore, their incentives in caring
for the confidentiality of attorney–client communications are at the
highest possible level of alignment—or at the very least it would be
reasonable for the court to expect such a high level of alignment.
Additionally, the privilege primarily aims to promote legal advice about
contemplated acts and it is less justified in the context of litigation, which
936, 939 (S.D. Fla. 1991) (finding an attorney’s inadvertent disclosure does not constitute waiver of
the attorney–client privilege); Helman v. Murry’s Steaks, Inc., 728 F. Supp. 1099, 1104 (D. Del.
1990) (concluding the inadvertent disclosure of documents by counsel did not waive the attorney–
client privilege); Mendenhall v. Barber-Greene Co., 531 F. Supp. 951, 955 (N.D. Ill. 1982)
(declaring a lawyer’s inadvertent disclosure does not forfeit the attorney–client privilege because
waiver requires “more than such negligence by counsel”); Harold Sampson Children’s Trust v. Linda
Gale Sampson 1979 Trust, 679 N.W.2d 794, 802 (Wis. 2004) (explaining that allowing an attorney
to unilaterally waive the privilege “would be placing too heavy a burden on the attorney–client
relationship”).
159. See Steven S. Gensler, Some Thoughts on the Lawyer’s E-volving Duties in Discovery, 36 N.
KY. L. REV. 521, 524 (2009) (noting the drafters intended discovery as preparation for trial and did
not anticipate management by the court).
160. See generally Jessica Wang, Note, Nonwaiver Agreements After Federal Rule of Evidence 502:
A Glance at Quick-Peek and Clawback Agreements, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1835, 1842–44 (2009)
(discussing two prominent types of nonwaiver agreements).
161. Additionally, courts do not always uphold these agreements. See id. at 1838 (explaining
attorneys sought nonwaiver agreements in an effort to cut privilege review costs, but “courts did not
act uniformly in upholding such agreements”); see also id. at 1841 (noting many courts have held
third parties could gain access to inadvertently disclosed information despite such agreements).
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revolves around the results of those acts the client has already taken.162
Thus, a waiver doctrine that narrows the scope of the privilege could be
better justified at the litigation stage.
Finally, fee-shifting arrangements, such as contingency fees, solve the
moral hazard problem by shifting the costs and risks of litigation from the
client to the lawyer.163 However, this solution raises a host of additional
problems. For example, it requires the lawyer to take into account the
possibility of losing the case due to inadvertent waiver by the client
occurring prior to the legal representation. A lawyer can avoid the costs of
such surprises by stipulating that in such a scenario, the fee-shifting
arrangement will be nullified and the client will be obliged to pay the
lawyer for his efforts. Naturally, this would deter some clients from
retaining the lawyer.

162. See Louis Kaplow & Stephen Shavell, Legal Advice About Information to Present in
Litigation: Its Effects and Social Desirability, 102 HARV. L. REV. 567, 569 (1989) (indicating simply
that legal advice during litigation does not “induce socially desirable behavior” because it is given after
the behavior has occurred); see also Steven Shavell, Legal Advice, in 2 THE NEW PALGRAVE
DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 516, 518 (Peter Newman ed., 1998) (claiming it is
impossible to conclude whether litigation advice has a socially desirable effect because while it “may
dilute deterrence of undesirable conduct,” it might also lower “sanctions for defendants who did not
violate the law”).
163. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.8(e) (2012) (stating “a lawyer may
advance court costs and expenses of litigation” to a client).
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